Philosophy in a Nutshell

Although philosophy has a long legacy, and is arguably responsible for all things academic (the natural sciences coming from Aristotle, psychology and sociology being 'applied philosophy' from the 1800s i.e. Freud on the one hand, and Comte and Durkheim on the other, mathematics coming from the Ancient Greeks).

Basically, philosophy was first summarized to me as an attempt to answer three questions:

1) Who are we?
2) What do we know?
3) What should we do?

The first question is usually dealt with in metaphysics, the second in epistemology, and the third in ethics and political/social philosophy. But of course there is a vast overlap between the two. 'Are we ethical beings?' might be a question put to the first, and this directly affects how the third should be answered, although in all fairness putting such a question to the first is already having 'loaded' it.

But more so, it is amazing that bashing away at these simple questions for millenia has basically made the world how we see it today. We apply (3) in every daily activity whether it be sports or academia. And to the second question, a sceptic might say 'nothing for certain' (or, like Socrates, say 'the only thing that I know is that I know nothing'), and so one could say that we haven't even gotten off the ground and never will.

So why do we worry about these questions? Well surely if we didn't we would still be in our caves.

Pascal's Can of Wagers

Last night I was thinking about Pascal's Wager and toying with making it the topic of today's post. Admittedly, a lot of the direction of the argument stems from various parts of the corresponding wikipedia article, but anyway...

Many know something of Blaise Pascal's famous wager with respect to the existence of God. I would wager (haha) that few have actually read the Pensées, and/or perhaps could not even recognize when it is alluded to, since most have simply seen it in the following simplified 'decision theory' form:

Wager:
(a) Believe in God
(b) Do not believe in God

Possibilities:
(i) God exists
(ii) God does not exist

Consequences:
(a) If (i) is true, then you get infinite bliss, if (ii) is true then you lose nothing.
(b) If (i) is true, you burn in Hell, if (ii) is true, you lose nothing.

One problem is that critics of his wager attack its simplified form. Walter Kaufmann, for example, argues that if God is truly omniscient, then surely he will frown upon (i.e. punish) someone trying to use a simple logical trick to get into Heaven, so surely such a method is bound to fail in the end. This criticism has been used to both satirize the Wager, and justify its false logic, for example:

"Suppose there is a god who is watching us and choosing which souls of the deceased to bring to heaven, and this god really does want only the morally good to populate heaven. He will probably select from only those who made a significant and responsible effort to discover the truth. For all others are untrustworthy, being cognitively or morally inferior, or both. They will also be less likely ever to discover and commit to true beliefs about right and wrong. That is, if they have a significant and trustworthy concern for doing right and avoiding wrong, it follows necessarily that they must have a significant and trustworthy concern for knowing right and wrong. Since this knowledge requires knowledge about many fundamental facts of the universe (such as whether there is a god), it follows necessarily that such people must have a significant and trustworthy concern for always seeking out, testing, and confirming that their beliefs about such things are probably correct. Therefore, only such people can be sufficiently moral and trustworthy to deserve a place in heaven — unless God wishes to fill heaven with the morally lazy, irresponsible, or untrustworthy." (Richard Carrier)

(I believe this sort of argument is sometimes referred to as 'Pascal's Demon', because it essentially tries to show that the Wager could actually be convincing people to take up a logical argument that is bound to fail in the face of God, thus recruiting minions to Hell).

However, in it's original form, Pascal's Wager is actually put forward as an impetus to faith, i.e.:

"Now, what harm will befall you in taking this side? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those poisonous pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I will tell you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you take on this road, you will see so great certainty of gain, so much nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognize that you have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have given nothing."

However, this does not deal with a host of other problems, one of the main being 'Ok, even if we accept Pascal's logic, what's to say whether we should believe in this God or that? Since there are so many possibilities, surely by choosing you are actually putting yourself at the risk of burning in the Hell of whatever God is up there, should it not be your own?'

But even if we put questions within religion to the side for a second, Pascal's Wager has opened up a proverbial can of worms ever since religion became such a controversial subject in the modern age due to many critics questioning, for example, its political motives (recall that during Pascal's time, religion was not often debated openly, and non-Christian religions were not as 'global' as they are now).

This new religious 'scrutiny', especially by those who see things like Pascal's Wager as a tool of 'flawed logic' to recruit people to religious sects, has opened up a proverbial can of worms in the sense that there are now many other versions of Pascal's Wager that attempt to satirize it and thus argue against its validity as a logical tool, as well to put forward alternatives to say that Pascal's 'logic' can be used to argue against believing in God; it all depends on how you put your argument forward. Religious critic Richard Dawkins, for example, puts forward the 'Anti-Pascal Wager' in The God Delusion by revaluing life as what's important (scored with infinite loss if you 'waste' it on kowtowing to God or infinite gain if you 'spend it wisely' on making a genuine effort to make a difference in the world itself) and afterlife as simply a meager 'bonus'. Another is the 'Atheist's Wager', which is akin to the 'Pascal's Demon' criticism above. It alleges that if you maintain scepticism then you may build a 'positive legacy' by doing good things in life, and this you gain, then if there does exist a God in the end, he will reward you for your good deeds as well as your staunch resistance to blind faith.

Whatever the outcome of the Wager or its many versions, Pascal's Wager was the beginning of modern decision theory/game theory (for example, the Prisoner's Dilemma), and thus, irrespective of the validity of its content, his suggestion/approach is definitely useful for philosophy. In true, demonic fashion, however, I must leave the last word to the critics:

"[Pascal's Wager is] indecent and childish... the interest I have to believe a thing is no proof that such a thing exists."

--Voltaire

"By arguing that we should first act and then gain faith Pascal is in fact subjecting us to physical domination through use of ideological power (i.e. we are being forced to physically kneel down, pray, etc.). For this reason Louis Althusser claims that Pascal brings 'like Christ, not peace but strife, and in addition something hardly Christian... scandal itself'."

--Wikipedia

'Living Labour' or 'Human Capital'?

As I was walking through Observatory last night on my way back from Rondebosch, I happened to look up at a sign I had seen numerous times before: it was an advertisement for the company that resided there, called 'CallStaff'. I had seen the name before and assumed it must be a temp agency, so I hadn't bothered too much with on the previous occasions that I had walked by. But last night I chanced to read (and process) the entire sign. At the bottom of the sign it said something to the effect of 'Temporary, Contract, and Permanent Labour Solutions', but right above that it said 'Human Capital Management'.

Human capital? I've heard of 'living labour' (as Marx termed it), but human capital? Isn't capital simply a broad term for financial assets, such as 'investment capital' is the amount of (surplus) financial assets that one has to re-invest? If that is the case, isn't it rather absurd to say that humans are 'owned'? (I mean, one could give the case that they are, at the very least, treated as such. But doesn't just coming out and saying it like that seem a bit brash?)

So I hired the help of dictionary.com, which provided me with the answer:

capital:

4. the wealth, whether in money or property owned or employed in business by an individual firm, corporation, etc.

5. an accumulated stock of such wealth.

6. any form of wealth employed or capable of being employed in the production of more wealth.

On the surface of it, it is perhaps a case of splitting hairs, when you hire someone to work for you, it seems a bit impertinent to say that you own them or that they are your property (at least, one would like to think this, though the reality of the situation is that one would likely not be surprised to see employees treated in such a way). But what is more interesting is definition #6. What is 'wealth'? Mostly we would think of wealth in terms of riches or abundance of something, or at least some sort of property, but Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations might lead us to be a bit suspicious of these general 'un-economic' ideas of wealth. So, dictionary.com again.

wealth:

3.a. all things that have a monetary or exchange value.
b. anything that has utility and is capable of being appropriated or exchanged

Ahhh! So now we have our answer. 'Human capital' is 'human wealth' (i.e. beings that can be utilized) capable of being employed in the production of more wealth.

Should we really be surprised, though? From my observations, the growing trend is that employees are facing greater and greater dehumanization for the sake of expanding the coffers of the rich elite. And yes, one may accuse me of being on a bit of a 'Marxist streak' after recent events in terms of completing my thesis. However, the main problem I have is when companies like 'CallStaff' are allowed to openly undermine human dignity by advertising themselves as a company that basically treats people like game pieces.

Or maybe that's not such a bad thing. Maybe it means that eventually people will be pushed to the limit and be forced to respond.

Any takers for the slogan 'Human Livestock Available! Rock Bottom Prices!'?

Probability, Philosophy, and Monty Hall

I'm not sure that it is possible to come up with something original every weekday, and today is one of those days where my mind is elsewhere. So here is something I've plagiarized word-for-word from a photocopy tacked to a wall in the mathematics department at UCT (the original author is Dr. J Ritchie, a senior lecturer on the Philosophy of Science here at UCT). I thought the ending fit nicely with some of the things I said yesterday with regard to consequentialism and finitism.

The Monty Hall Problem

Here's a puzzle you might have heard before. Imagine you are taking part in a game show. The host, Monty Hall, has three doors in front of him. Behind one there is a car and behind the other two a goat. At the end of the game you will have chosen one of the doors and you'll win whatever is inside. You want to win the car.

You start by choosing one door at random. Monty looks behind the other two doors and opens one of them to reveal a goat. He now offers you the chance to swap your door for the one he didn't open. What should you do?

Many people argue like this. There are only two possibilities: the car is either behind your door or Monty's, each is equally likely, so it doesn't matter which door you choose. But that's a mistake. There are three possibilities at the beginning of the game, all of which we assume are equally likely. Either you have chosen the door with the car or you've chosen the door with goat 1 or you've chosen the door with goat 2. If you swap in the first case, you'll win a goat. If you swap in the other two cases, then you'll win the car. Hence you're twice as likely to win if you swap, so you should swap.

That's a simple problem in probability theory but let's now think about it in a different way. Imagine instead of winning a car that Monty promises to shower you in riches, if you win. But if you lose, Monty will shoot you. Of course, you might not want to play that game. But tough, Monty has kidnapped all your family and threatened to kill them all and you unless you play. The game proceeds as before. You choose a door, Monty opens one of his doors to reveal a goat (which now represents your imminent death) and asks if you want to swap. What should you do?

We've ratcheted up the drama a bit, you might think, but the logic of the case remains the same. You are more likely to win if you swap. So you should swap. Let's say you swap and it turns out the door you are left with contains a goat; so Monty shoots you. In what sense, then, was it the right decision to swap?

The obvious response is that it is the right thing to do because, if you play the game a lot, you will win twice as often (on average) as you lose. Probabilities in other words tell us about long-run frequencies. But this kind of game you can't play a lot. Once you lose, you are in a very serious way out of the game for good. In fact since relative frequencies only converge on probabilities in the infinite long run and in the long-run we're all dead, is there any good reason ever to choose the more probable option? Now we've moved from a simple problem in probability theory to a hard problem in philosophy... But I've run out of space to offer you any solutions.

(By the way, you are invited to send possible solutions to jack.ritchie@uct.ac.za)

Some Reflections on Selfishness (or 'The Significance of Valentine's Day')

Last night I was again in my usual place in Rondebosch and got into a fairly heated debate with a friend of a friend from Tanzania. He had said he was 'interested in economics', so I pushed for a clarification of this by saying 'you mean your interested in capitalist economics, i.e. making money.' And he agreed. So I got to thinking about this notion of greed. Is it inherent? Or is it dependent on our social milieu, e.g. does it develop because of the idolization of those in power over others?

And since today is Valentine's Day when we (supposedly) should be thinking about our significant others, maybe a discussion of whether or not selfishness is inherent is a good topic. Does he really love you, or he is just offering you this cheap card because he has a hidden agenda? (But maybe you're accepting it because you also have a hidden agenda... but then maybe he knows that you know that he knows that you know... you get the picture...). To raise your suspicions even further (because my primary goal by publishing this post is to plant a seed of doubt about the value of 'superstition' in terms of certain days being supposedly 'more important' than others in terms of showing someone else you care, and so, in this instance I'm unfortunately out to make war, not love) let me share a humourous anecdote shared with me by some friends here in South Africa:

The son of a certain family is well-known by his family and most of his friends to be something of a 'Don Juan' (though I've not been able to affirm this through personal experience since he's currently in a detention center and I've only visited him once). Given that Valentine's Day was coming up, they told me about how there is a very large Valentine card that one of his aunts received some years ago. As luck would have it, the card was completely generic and not personalized. So every year on February 14 he takes this same gigantic card and gives it to whichever female is the apple of his eye at the time, and even though as the years go by its appearance has gotten old and crusty, as far as I know it's always greeted exceptionally favourably ('ohhh... the sacrifice you must have made to get such a Valentine card JUST FOR ME!!!'), and the guy usually gets what he wants (the substance of which is probably fairly obvious). So they joked that they should contact him and ask him who 'the Valentine' should go to this year... (so ladies, maybe this year you should check your Valentine cards a bit more carefully than years past for signs that it might have actually come from years past...)

But let's get back to theory, shall we? In Book 2 of The Republic, Plato tells the story of 'The Ring of Gyges'. He describes a shepherd named Gyges, who finds a ring that is able to make him invisible at will. He describes a sequence of events wherein the shepherd uses the powers of the ring to kill the king, marry the queen, and rule over the domain. Plato then declares that if a just man had found the ring, his actions would be the same as the unjust man,

"For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice."

In other words, Plato argues that the only reason why we are moral beings is because of the consequences that we face due to our actions. (Recall I previously brought up this notion of consequentialism at the end of the discussion of 'Sadist morality' in the post Exegesis in the Bedroom). If, in the case of having such a ring, you can do whatever you wish and no one could ever charge you with any action since they could never trace the action to you, there are seemingly no consequences. (If you've seen it, maybe think of Kevin Bacon in Hollow Man). Although this sequence of events could never conceivably happen, let's take this a step further.

Often an argument against materialistic greed is "he who dies with the most toys still dies" or, equivalently, "no matter what you have, you can't take it with", but let's look at it from a more 'statistical' vantage point. If one is to play Russian Roulette, and the revolver in question has six chambers only one of which contains a bullet, then you have only a 1/6 chances of dying. But the problem with statistics is that they only really 'work' long term. In normal roulette, if you lose, you can ante up and try again, but in Russian Roulette if you end up on the fatal chamber, you can't say 'the odds weren't in my favour, so let me try again', because you're dead and that's the bottom line.

So consider the following argument: what we really should blame human greed on is human finiteness, because in the end all 'worldly' consequences (i.e., death doesn't count), no matter how large, are, in the end, only temporary (consider, for example, the old adage that 'suicide is a permanent solution to a temporary problem'). For example, it may be all well and good to say 'we need to protect the Earth for future generations', but talk is cheap; in the end, any individual will be dead long before 'future generations' come into being. Conceivably, one can argue 'well surely my own future generations are equivalent to my existing in future generations': children, children's children, etc, but even if this is true, it really is an 'out of sight out of mind' problem, and, when the chip's are down, most people are willing to (deliberately or not) turn a blind eye to this sort of idea and show a real lack of foresight by exploiting the world's resources in whatever way tickles their fancy.

And this claim of finiteness extends to other's memories of events and consequences, which is why someone who 'holds a grudge' is so dangerous:

"How little the world would look moral without forgetfulness! A poet might say that God made forgetfulness the guard he placed at the threshold of human dignity."
--Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human

Perhaps, then, this is the real reason why Heaven is such a perfect place: everybody has to be moral because 'it's a loooooooooooooooong (i.e. infinite) ride and if I screw someone over, its gonna come back to haunt me' (But if that's the case, shouldn't Hell, which is also eternal, be equally perfect?)

Indeed, one sometimes wonders how those who believe in an otherworldly paradise can be so selfish and greedy, since if they happen to meet anyone up there who they screwed over down here, they're going to be hearing about it for a long time.

Or maybe not: maybe chronic amnesia is a prerequisite for human perfection, and is therefore an attribute of all residents of Heaven (save for God Himself, of course, who is omniscient)...

Confessions of a Pretentious Egomaniac

I mentioned in my introductory post something about if it was a perfect world, I would have my philosophy MA completed by now.

Well, as things have gone, the ‘problems’ with my treatment of Marx had been slowly whittled down to a handful that I received a couple of days ago. Most of them weren’t too troublesome, a bit here a bit there, but there was one that I was dreading:

27d Depending on how you treat history above, I'd emend 'Marx's ontology' to 'Marx's historical ontology' or 'Marx's historical materialist ontology'. Consider also the quote you give from Marx on real history at 28b. Note also Marx's quote at 29d on 'really existing active men' (that is, historically specific). FINALLY at 30a you give history a role but this is not consistent with the earlier claims. So make this consistent by bringing history into the picture earlier, as suggested above throughout.

So after dealing with the other problems, I was left with this one, and that meant the situation had come to a head, it was me vs. Marx, mano e mano.

You see, from the very beginning when I set out to do this degree, my intention was ‘to get a few ideas down on paper and leave with a degree in the process,’ and, true to my rather grandiose conceptions of my own abilities at the time given that I felt that I had already read ‘extensively’ in philosophy, entered the philosophy MA ring with a self-aggrandizing swagger.

Whilst there, amongst other things, I sat in a course on Marx. Unfortunately, my various ways coupled with what I saw as my father’s incessant attempts to ‘convert’ me to Marxist-Leninism beginning at a very young age (when really the only thing that I knew was that I WANT TO MAKE MY OWN MIND UP THANK YOU!) by bringing me to meetings which I didn’t at all care for, and associating me with people who were nice but whose ideas on Marx and ‘the coming revolution’ I didn’t want to hear, had made me rather cynical towards Marx and his ideas. Moreover, I had taken a course in undergrad on ‘Kant to Nietzsche’ so I already knew about Feuerbach as the ‘missing link’ between Hegel and Marx, and these other bits of trivia that I could use to impress my friends. The other problem was that my long-developed affinity with Schopenhauer, and my willingness to side with him on most issues meant my attitude toward Hegel was basically Schopenhauer’s attitude toward Hegel, e.g: “Hegel?? Pffft. What a charlatan. What a joke. People only say he’s profound because no one can make sense of all the gibberish that makes up his philosophy. Dialecticism? Gimme a break. Who cares?”

And so throughout most of the class, when fundamental concepts and implications were discussed, I didn’t really process anything, e.g. “Negation of the negation? Pfffft. ANYONE with half a brain knows that not-not-P = P. Let’s skip the obvious and get to the good stuff, like the interpretations of these other guys, this guy [Antonio] Negri, let’s just skip to him.” And yes, the individual who taught this course is the same individual who was on my panel for my original submission (though it was the other individual who demanded a re-submission for various other somewhat outlandish reasons, the individual in question simply demanded ‘fairly substantial revisions’), and he was also on my panel for my second submission where he again asked for revisions (though ‘less substantial), whilst the other one (who had been changed from the original one who asked for the resubmission) maintained that ‘no revisions were required’ (of course, that meant me saying 'the other person didn't ask for revisions: WHY OH WHY DOES THIS GUY HAVE TO BE SO PARTICULAR!!'), and to 'make matters worse' he had been given the task of seeing me over the finish line after necessity meant I had to change supervisors, so now he really was the sole 'Guardian of the Gate'.

And so throughout the entire time I admittedly railed against this individual inwardly, as misunderstanding me and not taking my approach seriously and being stuck in his ways and putting Marx on a pedestal, when, I thought, from an objective point of view, Marx is ‘just another philosopher’. And while I railed him, I railed against myself for choosing such a ‘difficult’ topic. If only I hadn’t been so cocky at the outset, to prove that I knew everything by taking on each of the two faculty members who did political philosophy ‘in their own backyard’ by including the two theorists, the one Marx, and the other Arendt, that each was most interested in. Surely if I had just settled for making the same argument with regard to Machiavelli and Rousseau, I would have been done long ago!

Anyway, because of the manner in which this ‘cocky aversion’ meant that I skipped over the fundaments of Marx as ‘elementary’ (though in actual fact, it turned out that I didn’t really have a clue), throughout all my numerous thesis attempts, revisions, and submissions, I had avoided the issue, ‘hmmm… history and dialectic… yeah it’s important… I sort of get how… I know I’ll eventually have to put it in here somewhere for ‘completeness’… guess I can fudge it by putting in what I know, adding a few quotes here and there, and saying ‘the approach I’ve taken means I don’t have to go into detail, so you better be satisfied with that.’

And maybe I could have succeeded if I had kept on this path as before. But finally I thought “alright… I’ve come this far… throughout this whole thesis process, I’ve learned that the Marx I thought I knew wasn’t even a shadow of the real Marx, that the real Marx was a pretty amazing guy who had some pretty amazing ideas, many of which I now think are pretty correct. I’ve taken care of everything else (I hope!) and included in that I just added almost a page and a half on the division of labour in about 30 minutes as part of my revisions, so why not give it a chance. How hard can it be?”

So I started with what I knew (or, at least, what I had come to understand by being forced back to Marx over and over again after I finally gave into the realization that I couldn’t fake it): the history part was easy enough, justifying its importance, discussing social relations, the socio-historical context of the individual, the development of the individual as a reciprocal relationship with society, etc. A lot of it was already there from previous revisions, so it wasn’t overly difficult. So that was done.

But dialectic? “Hmmm. I’ve really said nothing so far, so I really have nothing to add to. Gonna have to start from the beginning, or, at least, from the few tidbits I’ve scattered around to make it look like I know what I’m talking about. Alright, take a deep breath... Here goes nothin...

"Hmmm... Let's start with this quote that I had here before, about Feuerbach’s development of the ‘negation of the negation’. I originally put it in the history part, but I'm pretty sure it should be down here with the dialectic part... So let's go with that... Hmmm… still don’t see what’s so important about it. Marx was no logician that’s for sure, so there must be more to it than that. Hmmm, let’s check the index to my Marx-Engels Reader (which has basically been my bible every time I’ve had to re-visit this chapter) for some other mentions. Hmmm… these page numbers… all from the Economic and Philosophic Fragments… surely I’ve looked at all these already, but anyway, let’s try this one about its relationship to communism itself… Let’s see... Hmmm...

‘If we characterize communism itself because of its character as the negation of the negation, as the appropriation of the human essence which mediates itself with itself through the negation of private property—as being not yet the true, self-originating position but rather a position originating from private property, […]’

Wait. Why does it end so abruptly? What’s this ellipsis here about? Shit. The footnote says that the sentence is ‘impossible to restore’ because in the original manuscript too much of the page was torn off. Heh heh… that reminds me of Dead Souls… poor Gogol… what a crazy mofo he was… haha… But yeah, anyway… now let me guess, this is the ONE place where this is the case. Just my luck since this seems like it’s telling me something pretty important, I just can’t put my finger on it. Hmmm… communism… negation of negation…. ‘true’ position?? Hmmm… let me read this again… hmmm… true position… huh… communism… TRUE position… why? True?? True in what sense…??

Hey, wait a second! Is that it?? Is THAT what the negation of the negation means?? Nooo! Is THAT what dialecticism is?? Wow! That’s pretty cool, actually… Especially the way it all fits together. Hmmm… I can’t be sure, but it seems to fit. Hmmm… let’s try it out… Well it makes sense with Marx’s attitude towards Hegel… the whole idealism vs. reality thing… hmmm… is that REALLY it?? Is it really THAT simple?? So Marx wasn’t just another self-absorbed egomaniac when he talked about his own system bringing about ‘an end to history’?… And I guess I have to admit that maybe Hegel wasn't such an idiot after all (though that self-realization of Spirit stuff is still pretty ludicrous). And yeah it fits nicely with this other quote about history being ‘man’s act of coming-to-be’… Hmmm… it seems to fit with everything… so let’s try that…

[40 minutes and a page and a half later]

Huh… that looks pretty good I would say. Yeah… that really wasn’t so hard… It’s like the Red Sea just parted in front of me and showed me the way… Of course, I could be totally off, but it seems to fit with everything… Guess I’ll email it off tomorrow and see what the ol’ supervisor thinks… And yeah, if that works, I guess it means I’m done… Wow… Done… That’d be great… A ‘great weight’ lifted off of my shoulders; guess I’ll finally be able to ‘get on with my life’ (*snicker*)… And in the end a hundred pages of text exactly… Wow… Not bad… And, yeah, I guess if I had been able to swallow my pride a year ago and had not blamed the fact that I didn’t choose an ‘easier’ topic, and not blamed everyone for ‘misunderstanding’ me and going on and on about how it was ‘my thesis’ and about how ‘people’ (i.e. the individual in question) tried to force me to do it their way even though it was intended as a ‘novel interpretation’ of Marx and maybe I interpreted Marx differently than him, and blah blah blah… yeah, maybe if that all hadn’t happened I would have been done long ago.”

…but then on the other hand, if that was the case, first of all I DEFINITELY wouldn't have been able to develop such an intimate understanding of how deep and profound Marx's ideas really are (whether one agrees with them or not) by being forced to constantly scratch around in his works in order to basically rebuild his complete train of thought (because I was too stubborn to ask anyone else for any help or clarification).

But more importantly, I probably wouldn’t have been in a position to treat this thesis as a sort of ‘side-project’ the whole time while I visited 13 different countries over the 16-odd months between when I first submitted and now. And I probably wouldn’t be in Cape Town now having just spent 3+ months in India, Mozambique, and Swaziland after I arrived in Cape Town in July ready to begin and was told that I couldn’t register because I hadn’t finished my MA and couldn’t be in two programs at once. And since returning having everything go so well, enjoying life in Cape Town with my math MSc off to a ‘flyer’, trying my hand at Afrikaans, Swahili, and improving my Portuguese by joining the Mozambican student club, taking an interest in South African politics here and there, signing myself up to get involved in all sorts of writing projects at the university and in the community because I now honestly believe I’ve learned a lot, not only about political theory or about the world around me, but much more importantly, about myself. (And, admittedly, maybe this whole process has forced me to become a tad more humble... perish the thought...)

And, of course, the main reason why the whole process 'on the other side of it' (read: travel and all its benefits) has been such an absolute treat is because of the wonderfully amazing people I’ve met and gotten to know during the period. They have not only been the main reason why I’ve had such an enjoyable time thus far, but have also got me itching to take advantage of the countless possibilities and opportunities that they’ve opened up to and/or offered me. (You know who you are!)

So yeah, it stands to reason that I wouldn’t have all that. I suppose it’s possible I could have had something better by now (like another degree completed by now in place of all that?? Puh-lease!!), but I kinda doubt it.

So thanks Peter. Sure, the role you played in all of this may have been quite small, and I’m quite sure you knew of almost none of it, but at the end of the day I can say with a fair amount of surety that if you had just shrugged your shoulders and given me a free pass when I wanted it most instead of forcing me to put my head down and actually sweat it out, things might not be quite so rosy. And so despite all the stress and frustrations and endless lamentations I was made to endure over the past 16 months since my bubble was burst upon receiving the results of my first submission (what? they didn’t fall out of their chairs at how brilliant it was?? can this be true??? it wasn’t even ‘accepted with revisions’, I have to RE-SUBMIT ENTIRELY????), despite all of the insults and curses I hurled at you at those times when my sanity was seemingly stretched to its limit, and the completion of this thesis seemed to grow to the proportions of the Tower of Babel… despite all the times when, upon seeing that my latest revisions weren’t sufficient I turned around and said to anyone who would listen “damn this guy is so bloody unfair, just let it go already!! Just say yes!! It’s not like it’s being nominated for a Nobel Prize or being released as a best-seller, IT’S JUST ANOTHER BLOODY MASTERS THESIS!!” Yeah, despite all that, at the end of the day, I have to admit…

I owe you one.

What writing philosophy papers is REALLY about...

Due to various commitments (namely, trying to push through the last few revisions for my MA thesis), my head is elsewhere, so I'll just leave this to be pondered over...

What writing philosophy papers is REALLY about...

The secret is out.

In Praise of Idleness

"To have time was at once the most magnificent and the most dangerous of experiments. Idleness is fatal only to the mediocre." -- Albert Camus, A Happy Death

In truth, the quote above has been cheaply lifted from wikiquote. I've never read A Happy Death, nor have I read Bertrand Russell's essay from which I stole the title of the present topic. However, the notion of idleness is one that has become increasingly meaningful in the hustle and bustle of the present 'Western world' ruled by corporate imperialism and the prospect of get-rich-quick schemes.

Firstly, one should make sure to make a distinction between 'idleness' and 'laziness', although contemporary definitions have often blended the two. For example, if I allow my car to idle, I have not shut it off, nor have I made it in any way lazy; I have merely put it in a state of temporary stasis, neither entirely dormant, nor entirely active.

My interpretation of the above quote (and, since I have already admitted that I do not know the context in which it is written), is simply to say that there are those that treat idleness as a from of evasiveness or procrastination, while others treat idleness as a means to gather ones forces for a final onslaught.

Although the depiction of the battle of Stirling in Braveheart is entirely fictitious (it is usually referred to as the Battle of Stirling Bridge, because rather than being an open plain, there existed a bridge which was of tactical importance to the Scots in their victory), one could refer to the Scots as being 'idle' in the manner in which they wait for the English attack, but one could hardly accuse them of begin 'lazy'. It is the same, for example, with Fanon's depiction of the black man in The Wretched of the Earth, with muscles constantly tensed for an attack against the enemy, maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but eventually an attack will be inevitable.

And so, it seems that the problem with the 'mediocre' is that they submerge themselves in idleness in order to shirk from or avoid their duties. On the other hand, those that have a more 'advanced' idea of the tactical advantage of remaining idle for a period of time only to use the power reserved by this idleness to explode into vigorous action at a later date, are able to exploit 'idleness' as an opportunity.

In other words, it is the difference between how one approaches one's situation: i.e. it is the difference between 'we must avoid' and 'we must prepare'.

In the beginning, there was...

The infinite regress crops up more than one might think. Consider the following fairly common theological argument:

A: Where did you come from?
B: My parents.
A: And where did they come?
B: My grandparents?
A: And where did they come?
B: Great grandparents.
A: But you can go back and back and back and back, and eventually you will have a problem, no? So there must be a Creator.

This is, in essence, the 'Cosmological Proof' of Thomas Aquinas. A short version is the following:
1. Every being is either a dependent or a self-existent being.
2. Not every being can be a dependent being.
3. Therefore there must be a self-existent being.

Of course, this does not tell us anything about the nature of this self-existent being. Indeed, a deist can turn around and say "that may be true, but why should this self-existent being care about us at all? If I walk along the beach, I leave footprints in the sand. I don't deny that these footprints cannot be uncaused, and that I am the cause, but it doesn't mean that I care about them after the fact." And indeed, an atheist can go further and say "why not just claim that the universe itself is a self-existent being?" (This would include the 'oscillating universe' cosmological theory.

So although the infinite regress may be a weapon for an argument, one must be careful that it is not turned against oneself!

Another area in which the infinite regress poses problems is with respect to the notion of 'a priori' knowledge. That is, knowledge prior to experience. Descartes, a rationalist, required an a priori justification for existence in his famous 'cogito ergo sum' argument. The clashes between the ideas of contemporaries Leibniz (the same Leibniz whose name arises in mathematics) and Locke with regard to whether or not a priori knowledge was possible is, in some ways, a definitive characterization of the difference between rationalism and empiricism.

Let us consider another major problem that the infinite regress points to: that of determinism. If everything must have a cause, then how is liberty/free will possible? This is a very important question, since its being posed by Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding was what 'woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber'. Hume had concluded

"Whatever definition we may give to liberty, we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances; first, that it be consistent with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it[:] … liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence."

In other words, we can be 'free' with respect to constraint (e.g. not in prison), but our actions are necessitated by something else, i.e. according to Hume free will is impossible. One can conceive of it in the following way: consider every second or millisecond or ample 'division of time' as a 'frame' of existence. Then every 'frame' is somehow dependent on the previous 'frame'. If I suddenly 'choose' to go for a walk, it is only because there was something in the previous 'frame' that prompted me to do so, whatever that may have been.

Kant took this problem very seriously, and eventually attempted to argue that sponte (that is, uncaused events) can arise in the realm of thought. This prompted the German idealists after him: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer to name a few, to come up with a way to 'iron out' the problems with regard to Kant's notions of freedom, i.e. the 'uncaused cause', though Schopenhauer broke from this trend and, in his essay 'On the Freedom of the Will', sides with Hume and explains that there cannot be such a thing as free will. Kant is one of the most important philosophers in the history of modern philosophy. His ideas led the way to Hegel who led the way to Marx, et al, and to Schopenhauer who led the way to Nietzsche, et al. Schelling's is often considered to be the first person to coin the term 'unconscious' and his ideas are a major contribution to modern psychology.

So, we have a lot that we owe to the infinite regress, unless, of course, ignorance is, indeed, bliss. For one cannot even begin to ponder a world without Kant.

Where would we be now if Kant had remained asleep?

Let's see... where can I begin...?

It may be seen as the bane of philosophy, and the boon of scepticism. We have all had the experience, especially with young children: an inquiring mind asks for an explanation, and upon giving the explanation, you are again asked a justification for this explanation, and on and on and on, until you have to say something to the effect of 'I don't know' or 'it just is', or you have to give a response akin to 'I don't have time for this'. It is the infinite regress. And it stems from the apparent absurdity of the 'causa incausata', the uncaused cause. In other words, it comes down to the question, how can something result from nothing (and/or itself)?

There are two main areas where this shows itself: in metaphysics, and in epistemology. In metaphysics, it arises because of the nature of time and its connection to causality: if something happens, there seemingly must be something that happened before it to cause it to be so; in epistemology (in which the problem is not so different) it follows the pattern of the above paragraph: if you want to argue for or establish a truth, you must provide a justification, but then this justification must also have a justification, and so on, ad infinitum.

The problem of the infinite regress is used mostly for a sceptical approach. One of the first (over 1500 years before Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and, arguably, the most illuminating summary of this idea is that of Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 AD) in his Outlines of Scepticism. He describes the two situations thus:

I) [Epistemic] [179] They do not concede that anything can be apprehended by means of something else. If that by means of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means of something else, they throw you into the reciprocal or infinite mode; and if you should want to assume that that by means of which another thing is apprehended is itself apprehended by means of itself, then this is countered by the fact that, for the above reasons [which I have excluded], nothing is apprehended by means of itself.

II) [Metaphysical] [185] The [causal] explanation which is offered will either be in agreement with all the philosophical schools as well as with Scepticism and what is apparent or it will not. No doubt it cannot be in agreement; for both what is apparent and what is unclear are all subject to dispute. [186] But if it is subject to dispute, we shall ask for an explanation for this explanation as well; and if he gives an apparent explanation for an apparent explanation or an unclear of an unclear, he will be thrown back ad infinitum, whereas if he gives his explanation crosswise he will fall into the reciprocal mode. If he takes a stand somewhere, then either he will say that the explanation holds so far as what he has said goes, and will introduce something relative, rejecting what is by nature, or else he will assume something as a hypothesis and be led to suspend judgment.


One should note, however, that Sextus is not an absolute sceptic i.e. he is careful to limit this to 'belief', whereas "[Pyrrhonian] Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances—for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences."

So what is to be done? Must we, when asked for an explanation, however simple, heed the same warning that Dante put above the gates of Hell in The Inferno, namely "Abandon hope all ye who enter here"?

Exegesis in the Bedroom

As outlandish and immoral as it may seem, Sade's 'approach' is not only shocking in terms of its details, it is also very important in terms of questioning some very fundamental moral values.

Having read du Plessix's Gray's At Home With the Marquis de Sade, it is known that the descriptions in his works are no mere fantasy, but, in some sense, accurately depict Sade's own 'approach' to life. Thus, works like Philosophy in the Bedroom may be seen as a sort of attempted justification and a challenge to the rest of the world, asking "why should the way I (choose to) live my life (i.e. with libertinism and debauchery aplenty) be deemed immoral and/or criminal?"

This is indeed a very good question, and one, in my opinion that shakes us to the very core. It is not difficult to come up with some fairly valid reasons why it should be deemed immoral for one to go out on rampages and commit mass murder, simply because your happiness is clearly at the expense of others, and it is a great expense; often another's life is the price one pays for the pleasures of such a 'homicidal maniac'.

But with morality 'in the bedroom', where (ideally) each is happy because of the pleasure that they are experiencing, why should such things be deemed 'sordid' and 'immoral'? After all, "it is only by sacrificing everything to the senses' pleasure that this individual, who never asked to be cast into this universe of woe, that this poor creature who goes under the name of Man, may be able to sow a smattering of roses atop the thorny path of life."

It is easy to come up with fairly substantial arguments that justify this stance towards debauchery when one considers it under the watchful eye of religion. In Christianity and many other religions that preach asceticism, such as many Eastern religions (Buddhism, Hinduishm, etc), the 'pleasures of the flesh' are quite clearly deemed 'sinful' since they fly in the face of the manner of self-denial and self-mortification that such religions dictate. But can one say that this treatment of debauchery as 'sordid' and 'immoral' can be ENTIRELY traced back to religion or, at the very least, some other authoritarian (e.g. monarchical or autocratic) creed?

Issues of health aside, there are issues of power and control that arise. A certain idea of 'freedom' can become very much under threat if the event is not completely 'egalitarian'. This is especially a concern when considered with regard to the largely patriarchal history of humanity, and indeed the simple biological fact that men are able to 'spread their seed' at will, while women are left to 'carry the can' for nine months at a time seems to tip the balance in favour of some sort of inequality. Of course, this does not apply to sexual practices where pregnancy cannot result for whatever reason, and these are most often treated as the most heinous of all. And although 'pleasure' might seem to be a substitute for happiness, issues of dignity and self-worth also come into play with regard to such an issue, so psychology also plays a major role: by being objectified, it becomes easier for one to objectify oneself, and this is, in some sense, a form of dehumanization. At the same time, though, this becomes a sort of chicken-egg problem: did self-worth and dignity arise because of asceticism and morality, or is it the other way around? In other words, is such sexual objectification of oneself or others deemed a form of dehumanization simply because it is, in most cases, not a socially acceptable human practice? E.g., education, which is seen as primary for the human race would never be seen as a form of dehumanization, even though it often seems to be becoming more and more the case that students are treated like cattle on an assembly line to cater to capitalistic needs/desires. This 'educational dehumanization' is especially a valid consideration with regard to some of the (supposedly) despotic educational set-ups they sometimes (supposedly) maintain in Eastern Europe and the Far East, though one can argue that 'rehumanization' occurs when the individual re-enters the greater world being able to reap education's benefits, whilst with debaucherous practices, the resulting advantage is not immediately clear.

Whatever the 'reasons', it is an important issue to consider. If we leave aside divine judgment, then who is to judge such an act but ourselves? And if this is so, why does it make us uncomfortable, especially if (if the heavy traffic on pornography sites is to be taken for an accurate survey of the interests of the general population), we are able to so easily fantasize about it? Is it due to social conditioning? Psychology? Conscience? Biology?

Or is it simply down to consequentialism, that one worries about opening a proverbial can of worms, since the penalties for debauchery are numerous (even outside social stigmata like criminal punishment and/or religious judgment), including injury, disease, being egregiously harmed by a jealous lover, etc: i.e., if one wishes to lead such a life, must they not only be a moral nihilist, but also an existential nihilist? And is this question based on the fact that such practices would now surely exist in the minority with respect to the general population (and therefore be treated with the utmost scrutiny, rather than accepted as justified), and not for any other reason?

Philosophy in the Bedroom

To Libertines:
Voluptuaries of all ages, of every sex, it is to you only that I offer this work; nourish yourselves upon its principles: they favour your passions, and these passions, whereof coldly insipid moralists put you in fear, are naught but the means Nature employs to bring man to the ends she prescribes to him; harken only to these delicious promptings, for no voice save that of the passions can conduct you to happiness.
Lewd women, let the voluptuous Saint-Ange be your model; after her example, be heedless of all that contradicts pleasure's divine laws, by which all her life she was enchanted.
You young maidens, too long constrained by a fanciful Virtue's absurd and dangerous bonds and by those of a disgusting religion, imitate the fiery Eugénie; be as quick as she to destroy, to spurn all those ridiculous precepts inculcated in you by imbecile parents.
And you, amiable debauchees, you who since youth have known no limits but those of your desires and who have been governed by your caprices alone, study the cynical Dolmancé, proceed like him and go as far as he if you too would travel the length of those flowered ways your lechery prepares for you; in Dolmancé's academy be at last convinced it is only by exploring and enlarging the sphere of tastes and whims, it is only by sacrificing everything to the senses' pleasure that this individual, who never asked to be cast into this universe of woe, that this poor creature who goes under the name of Man, may be able to sow a smattering of roses atop the thorny path of life.

--The Marquis de Sade

"The supreme value of [Sade's] testimony lies in its ability to disturb us. It forces us to reexamine thoroughly the basic problem which haunts our age in different forms: the true relation between man and man."

--Simone de Beauvoir

What is an authentic experience?

Yesterday I was sitting in a pub in Rondebosch (the one I tend to frequent) and the pub, which is by all accounts a 'black' pub, was inundated with whites. It was rather amusing, since I knew that the reason likely had to do with the fact that the new school year is upon us, and there are American overseas students aplenty who are doing a semester abroad and mostly living in Rondebosch as near as possible to UCT. The pub in question is the main one down the hill from UCT, and clearly these curious folk have an eye for some 'cultural immersion'.

But then I got to thinking, isn't this sort of experience somewhat 'inauthentic'? Is it not the case that people see you as white or American or whatever before they see you as human, and doesn't that affect the way they approach and/or treat you? When my friends had temporarily left me sitting alone with my beer, a young white South African came up to me and, a bit tipsy, said 'nice to see a white bro at the Pig'. In terms of experience, authenticity seems to require that you are seen as a human being before you are seen as a certain TYPE of human being. It was similar when I was staying in Chamanculo; I wanted to know how people 'normally' acted, but given that I was a white guy walking around a slum in Maputo with a smile on my face and seemingly reckless abandon, their behaviour around me was obviously affected.

I suppose the best example of an 'authentic' experience is John Howard Griffin's experience in Black Like Me, e.g.:

* * *
I told myself that I was tired, that I must not judge these men who picked me up and for the price of a ride submitted me to the swamps of their fantasy lives. They showed me something that all men have but seldom bring to the surface, since most men seek health. The boy ended up wanting me to expose myself to him, saying he had never seen a Negro naked. I turned mute, indrawn, giving no answer. The silence rattled between us and I felt sorry for the reprimand that grew from me to him in the silence. I did not want this cruelty to him, since I knew that he showed me a side of his nature that was special to the night and the situation, a side rarely brought to light in his everyday living. I stared at the dimly lighted car dashboard and saw him attending an aunt’s funeral, having Sunday dinner with his parents, doing some kindness for a friend—for he was kind. How would I let him see that I understood and that I still respected him, and that I formed no judgment against him for this momentary slip? For instead of seeing it as a manifestation of some poor human charity, he might view it as confirmation that Negroes are insensitive to sexual aberration, that they think nothing of it—and this would carry on the legend that has so handicapped the Negro.
“I wasn’t going to do anything to you,” he said in a voice lifeless with humiliation. “I’m not queer or anything.”
“Of course not,” I said. “It’s nothing.”
“It’s just that I don’t get a chance to talk to educated Negroes—people that can answer questions.”
“You make it more complicated than it is,” I said. “If you want to know about the sexual morals of the Negro—his practices and ideals—it’s no mystery. These are human matters, and the Negro is the same human as the white man. Just ask yourself how it is for a white man and you’ll know the answers. Negro trash is the same as white trash. Negro decency is about the same, too.”
“But there are differences. The social studies I’ve read…”
“They don’t deal with any basic difference in human nature between black and white,” I said. “They only study the effects of environment on human nature. You place the white man in the ghetto, deprive him of educational advantages, arrange it so he has to struggle hard to fulfill his instinct for self-respect, give him little physical privacy and less leisure, and he would after a time assume the same characteristics you attach to the Negro. These characteristics don’t spring from whiteness or blackness, but from a man’s conditioning.”
“Yes, but Negroes have more illegitimate children, earlier loss of virginity and more crime—these are established facts,” he insisted without unkindness.
“The fact that the white race has the same problems proves these are not Negro characteristics, but the product of our condition as men,” I said. “When you force humans into a subhuman mode of existence, this always happens. Deprive a man of any contact with the pleasures of the spirit and he’ll fall completely into those of the flesh.”
“But we don’t deprive you people of the ‘pleasures of the spirit,’” he said.
“In most places we can’t go to the concerts, the theater, the museums, public lectures… or even to the library. Our schools in the South don’t compare to the white schools, poor as they are. You deprive a man of educational opportunities and he’ll have no knowledge of the great civilizing influences of art, history, literature, and philosophy. Many Negroes don’t even know these things exist. With practically nothing to exalt to the mind or exercise the spirit, any man is going to sink to his lowest depths. It becomes vicious—and tragic.”
“I can’t imagine how it must be,” he said. “I don’t think it’s fair. But just the same, plenty of whites don’t have access to these things—to art, literature, history, and philosophy. Some of the finest people I know live in the country where they never get to museums, concerts.”
“Living in the country, they are surrounded by natural museums and concerts,” I said. “Besides, those doors are always open to them. The Negro, too, fares better in the country. But most are deprived of education. Ignorance keeps them poor, and when a town-dwelling Negro is poor, he lives in the ghetto. His wife has to work usually, and this leaves the children without parental companionship. In such places, where all of man’s time is spent just surviving, he rarely knows what it means to read a great book. He has grown up and now sees his children grow up in squalor. His wife usually earns more than he. He is thwarted in his need to be father-of-the-household. When he looks at his children and his home, he feels the guilt of not having given them something better. His only salvation is not to give a damn finally, or else he will fall into despair. In despair, a man’s sense of virtue is dulled. He no longer cares. He will do anything to escape it—steal or commit acts of violence—or perhaps try to lose himself in sensuality. Most often the sex-king is just a poor devil trying to prove the manhood that his whole existence denies. This is what the whites call the ‘sorry nigger’. Soon he will either desert his home or become so unbearable he is kicked out. This leaves the mother to support the children alone. To keep food in their bellies, she has to spend most of her time away from them, working. This leaves the children to the streets, prey to any sight, any conversation, any sexual experiment that comes along to make their lives interesting or pleasurable. To a young girl who has nothing, has never known anything, the baubles she can get—both in a kind of crude affection and in gifts or money—by granting sex to a man or boy appeal to her as toys to a child. She gets pregnant sometimes and then the vicious cycle is given impetus. In some instances the mother cannot make enough to support her children, so she sells her sex for what she can get. This gets easier and easier until she comes up with still another child to abort or support. But none of this is ‘Negro-ness’.”
“I don’t know…” he sighed. “It looks like a man could do better.”
“It looks that way to you, because you can see what would be better. The Negro knows something is terribly wrong, but with things the way they are, he can’t know that something better actually exists on the other of work and study. We are all born blank. It’s the same for blacks or whites or any other shade of man. Your blanks have been filled in far differently from those of a child grown up in the filth and poverty of the ghetto.”
He drove without speaking through a thundershower that crinkled the windshield and raised the hum of his tires an octave.
“But the situation is changing,” I said after a time. “The Negro may not understand exactly how, but he knows one thing—the only way out of this tragedy is through education, training. Thousands of them sacrifice everything to get the education, to prove once and for all that the Negro’s capacity for learning, for accomplishment, is equal to that of any other man—that the pigment has nothing to do with degrees of intelligence, talent or virtue. This isn’t just wishful thinking. It’s been proved conclusively in every field.”
“We don’t hear about those things,” he said.
“I know. Southern newspapers print every rape, attempted rape, suspected rape, and ‘maybe rape’, but outstanding accomplishment is not considered newsworthy. Even the Southern Negro has little chance to know this, since he reads the same slanted reports in the newspapers.”
The young man slowed to a halt in a little settlement to let me out.
“I’m sorry about a while ago—I don’t know what got into me,” he said.
“I’ve already forgotten it.”
“No offense?”
“No offense.”
“Okay. Good luck to you.”
* * *

The truth is that for the fatally curious individual, you want people to be people, and you want to know what people are 'really' like, and it ends up being a sort of Catch-22 situation, since at the outset people treat you based on what they see in your appearance, and then once they get to know you, they treat you as a friend. There is seemingly no 'middle ground' where you can experience an authentic 'first impression' from another; i.e. 'pretend I'm just like anyone else; how would you react?' But in the end, maybe this is a good thing, because, as was discussed in the previous post, it means that there is no concept of 'normal': the unique attributes of any individual depict how he/she is reacted to. Still, though, I believe it would be nice to walk around a place like Khayelitsha without drawing attention to myself, to see how 'day-to-day struggles' unfold.

Maybe I need to have a talk with John Howard Griffin's dermatologist...

What is normal?

It is easy to answer that question with regard to a 'thing'. It is 'normal' if it is devoid of defects. A 'normal' tomato would be one devoid of defects, or a 'normal' rock might be one that has managed to avoid being encrusted with dirt or barnacles. Normalcy can even be extended to animals: one can discern between a 'normal' dog and a rabid dog, a 'normal' horse and a lame horse, etc.

But when consciousness comes into the picture, it is a different story. One can only make comparisons based on outward appearances of others, and since consciousness is an entirely internal phenomenon it presents two problems: first, how can one know if another person is 'normal' if one cannot see into another's consciousness and internal thoughts, and second, how can one know if one's own consciousness (and therefore oneself) is 'normal' if there are no other known consciousnesses that it can be properly compared to?

So if one wishes to appeal to a notion of normalcy within humans, one is limited to assumptions based on observable acts in others. If one sees another constantly in tears where everyone else maintains a more sober expression, one may have strong grounds to believe that such a person is not 'normal', or, at the very least, not in a 'normal' frame of mind.

The danger, however, is when one begins to equate 'normalcy' with 'predictability'. If one is playing chess, for example, a queen sacrifice would be considered an 'abnormal' phenomenon because it has a very low percentage chance of occurring in a given game. One might say "I didn't see that coming", i.e. I couldn't PREDICT that that would occur. And so one's idea of a normal person might be heavily skewed towards a seemingly equivalent notion of a person whose actions are predictable, whereas one who is constantly acting in such a way that seems 'out of the blue' may be seen as 'abnormal' since one ascertains that their consciousness and thoughts patterns are working in a different manner than what the norm might be deemed to be. However, it is only through the unpredictable that we can have the notion of the 'new' and forms of 'development'. An inventor, especially one as ingenious as Da Vinci would, with good reason, be deemed highly 'abnormal' given the machines and/or artwork that he is able to conceive of.

But then we must conclude that 'abnormal' is not a bad thing. On the contrary, it is what allows the human race to evolve from a species of cave-dwelling creatures to what they are today. Indeed, to see that 'abnormalcy' is good, we need only consider the notion of 'normalcy' in lieu of evolutionary biology and genetics, wherein evolution is deemed to occur through genetic aberration or mutation or some form of aberrant behaviour.

Of course, not all such aberrations can be deemed 'good', and indeed some genetic mutation that cause sterility or severe mental incapacitation or actions that reflect said 'problems' could not be considered 'good' at all, even if they should be deemed 'abnormal'. When I ride the local trains in Cape Town, oftentimes there are individuals who will preach fanatically and endlessly about Christianity, and the salvation provided by God through Jesus Christ. I will think to myself 'if the topic of your sermon was not religion, I'm fairly certain you would be locked up by now', which goes to show how 'normal' religion and theology have also become, but even further than this, how normal it has become to advocate your religion through preaching and recruiting on the one hand, while discrediting other religions on the other. It is akin to the idea that if you take out a machine gun and mow down a bunch of people in a quiet village, you are seen as VERY 'abnormal', but if it is in the heat of a battle or war, it is not only acknowledged as acceptable, but even encouraged. So 'normalcy' must also depend on a social context.

Despite these problems, we cannot deny that it is because of the 'abnormal' that we have all of the machinery and luxuries and ideas and entertainment and 'interesting' things of the world today. And so in the end, I must put my lot behind Giota, who, when she came to the door to greet me the first time I arrived in Los Angeles six or so years ago completely unknown and completely unannounced and heard me say "I'll try to explain but you'll think I'm crazy" calmly replied

"Crazy is good."

Philosophy IS sexy (or it simply attracts the insane)

There have been numerous examples in history of dangerous liaisons occurring within the greater philosophy community. A primary example would be what went on between Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger when she was a student of his. Heidegger had controversially backed National Socialism (the Nazi movement), once describing it after its disintegration as 'a grand social experiment gone horribly wrong'. Arendt, on the other hand, was a German Jew, so the liaison was dangerous indeed, culminating in the need for Heidegger to send Arendt to do her PhD under Karl Jaspers. I dont know all the details, but from what I know, Arendt's relationship to Heidegger blew very hot and cold and her philosophy during her time with Heidegger (after which she was heavily influenced by Jaspers and Aristotle to conceive of the notion of 'political action' and take a strong stand against the so-called 'totalitarian' regimes of the day) at times reflects Heidegger's own phenomenological musings, and at times challenges them directly. Moreover, her acceptance of not only Heidegger's themes and ideas but their relationship in general more than likely became more strained and possibly estranged by Jaspers' estrangement from Heidegger over Heidegger's support of National Socialism.

The most famous example would probably be one of the real 'Don Juans' of modern philosophy: Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre was not an overly attractive individual physically (the fact that he suffered from strabismus would have put a damper on this) but his numerous liaisons—not only the 'main' polyamorous one with de Beauvoir, but with numerous students of his, some many decades younger—is legendary. The book 'Hearts and minds: The common journey of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre' by Axel Madsen is a beautifully written and very complex book about what can only be described as 'existential love'. I recall a story that was put to me by the boyfriend (now husband) of a friend of mine who studied philosophy under Robert Birch. Birch was a student of Gadamer and, as I was told, once went to Paris and rented a flat along a road that was apparently frequented by Sartre at the time (Sartre died in 1980). So the story goes (if I remember correctly) there was no sign of Sartre until the last day when Birch happened to look out the window and see Sartre slowly walking by on the arm of a very young woman. At that moment, a taxi pulled up along side him and Simone de Beauvoir got out and began accosting and (apparently) attacking him with her purse. Perhaps an urban myth, but sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.

The final story is one of the strangest in the history of philosophy. It involves a fairly little-known philosopher by the name of Moritz Schlick. Schlick was in charge of putting together and chairing the 'Vienna Circle', which was a group of logical positivist philosophers who based their approach to philosophy on 'Wittgenstein I' and the Tractatus (see the entry 'Luki'). It included such individuals as Carnap, Neurath, Gödel, and others. But if Schlick was not so well-known, what sets him apart?

The wikipedia article on Schlick states:
"With the rise of the Nazis in Germany and Austria, many of the Vienna Circle's members left for America and the United Kingdom. Schlick, however, stayed on at the University of Vienna. When visited by Herbert Feigl in 1935, he expressed dismay at events in Germany. On June 22, 1936, Schlick was ascending the steps of the University for a class when he was confronted by a former student, Johann Nelböck, who drew a pistol and shot him in the chest. Nelbock claimed that Schlick's philosophy had "interfered with his moral restraint" - by which he probably meant that under the encouragement of Schlick's philosophy he had indulged himself homosexually, and in a paranoid displacement blamed Schlick for his "defilement". Schlick died very soon afterward. The student was tried and sentenced, but he became a cause célèbre for the growing anti-Jewish sentiments in the city. (That Schlick was not Jewish tended to be overlooked.) Nelböck was paroled after serving 2 years of a 10 year sentence & shortly afterward became a member of the Austrian Nazi Party after the Anschluss."

However, in the book 'Wittgenstein's Poker', other theories have been put forward for Nelbock's actions. One such theory is based on the fact that apparently Nelbock regularly attended Schlick's lectures, often sitting alone at the back of the room. It is said that he became incredibly infatuated with one of Schlick's female students, who often sat in the front row of Schlick's lectures. The theory goes that Nelbock believed that there was something going on between Schlick and this woman and the assassination was the result of jealous rage in a deranged individual.

That explanation is so much more interesting.