It may be seen as the bane of philosophy, and the boon of scepticism. We have all had the experience, especially with young children: an inquiring mind asks for an explanation, and upon giving the explanation, you are again asked a justification for this explanation, and on and on and on, until you have to say something to the effect of 'I don't know' or 'it just is', or you have to give a response akin to 'I don't have time for this'. It is the infinite regress. And it stems from the apparent absurdity of the 'causa incausata', the uncaused cause. In other words, it comes down to the question, how can something result from nothing (and/or itself)?
There are two main areas where this shows itself: in metaphysics, and in epistemology. In metaphysics, it arises because of the nature of time and its connection to causality: if something happens, there seemingly must be something that happened before it to cause it to be so; in epistemology (in which the problem is not so different) it follows the pattern of the above paragraph: if you want to argue for or establish a truth, you must provide a justification, but then this justification must also have a justification, and so on, ad infinitum.
The problem of the infinite regress is used mostly for a sceptical approach. One of the first (over 1500 years before Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and, arguably, the most illuminating summary of this idea is that of Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 AD) in his Outlines of Scepticism. He describes the two situations thus:
I) [Epistemic] [179] They do not concede that anything can be apprehended by means of something else. If that by means of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means of something else, they throw you into the reciprocal or infinite mode; and if you should want to assume that that by means of which another thing is apprehended is itself apprehended by means of itself, then this is countered by the fact that, for the above reasons [which I have excluded], nothing is apprehended by means of itself.
II) [Metaphysical] [185] The [causal] explanation which is offered will either be in agreement with all the philosophical schools as well as with Scepticism and what is apparent or it will not. No doubt it cannot be in agreement; for both what is apparent and what is unclear are all subject to dispute. [186] But if it is subject to dispute, we shall ask for an explanation for this explanation as well; and if he gives an apparent explanation for an apparent explanation or an unclear of an unclear, he will be thrown back ad infinitum, whereas if he gives his explanation crosswise he will fall into the reciprocal mode. If he takes a stand somewhere, then either he will say that the explanation holds so far as what he has said goes, and will introduce something relative, rejecting what is by nature, or else he will assume something as a hypothesis and be led to suspend judgment.
One should note, however, that Sextus is not an absolute sceptic i.e. he is careful to limit this to 'belief', whereas "[Pyrrhonian] Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances—for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences."
So what is to be done? Must we, when asked for an explanation, however simple, heed the same warning that Dante put above the gates of Hell in The Inferno, namely "Abandon hope all ye who enter here"?
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