In the beginning, there was...

The infinite regress crops up more than one might think. Consider the following fairly common theological argument:

A: Where did you come from?
B: My parents.
A: And where did they come?
B: My grandparents?
A: And where did they come?
B: Great grandparents.
A: But you can go back and back and back and back, and eventually you will have a problem, no? So there must be a Creator.

This is, in essence, the 'Cosmological Proof' of Thomas Aquinas. A short version is the following:
1. Every being is either a dependent or a self-existent being.
2. Not every being can be a dependent being.
3. Therefore there must be a self-existent being.

Of course, this does not tell us anything about the nature of this self-existent being. Indeed, a deist can turn around and say "that may be true, but why should this self-existent being care about us at all? If I walk along the beach, I leave footprints in the sand. I don't deny that these footprints cannot be uncaused, and that I am the cause, but it doesn't mean that I care about them after the fact." And indeed, an atheist can go further and say "why not just claim that the universe itself is a self-existent being?" (This would include the 'oscillating universe' cosmological theory.

So although the infinite regress may be a weapon for an argument, one must be careful that it is not turned against oneself!

Another area in which the infinite regress poses problems is with respect to the notion of 'a priori' knowledge. That is, knowledge prior to experience. Descartes, a rationalist, required an a priori justification for existence in his famous 'cogito ergo sum' argument. The clashes between the ideas of contemporaries Leibniz (the same Leibniz whose name arises in mathematics) and Locke with regard to whether or not a priori knowledge was possible is, in some ways, a definitive characterization of the difference between rationalism and empiricism.

Let us consider another major problem that the infinite regress points to: that of determinism. If everything must have a cause, then how is liberty/free will possible? This is a very important question, since its being posed by Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding was what 'woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber'. Hume had concluded

"Whatever definition we may give to liberty, we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances; first, that it be consistent with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it[:] … liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence."

In other words, we can be 'free' with respect to constraint (e.g. not in prison), but our actions are necessitated by something else, i.e. according to Hume free will is impossible. One can conceive of it in the following way: consider every second or millisecond or ample 'division of time' as a 'frame' of existence. Then every 'frame' is somehow dependent on the previous 'frame'. If I suddenly 'choose' to go for a walk, it is only because there was something in the previous 'frame' that prompted me to do so, whatever that may have been.

Kant took this problem very seriously, and eventually attempted to argue that sponte (that is, uncaused events) can arise in the realm of thought. This prompted the German idealists after him: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer to name a few, to come up with a way to 'iron out' the problems with regard to Kant's notions of freedom, i.e. the 'uncaused cause', though Schopenhauer broke from this trend and, in his essay 'On the Freedom of the Will', sides with Hume and explains that there cannot be such a thing as free will. Kant is one of the most important philosophers in the history of modern philosophy. His ideas led the way to Hegel who led the way to Marx, et al, and to Schopenhauer who led the way to Nietzsche, et al. Schelling's is often considered to be the first person to coin the term 'unconscious' and his ideas are a major contribution to modern psychology.

So, we have a lot that we owe to the infinite regress, unless, of course, ignorance is, indeed, bliss. For one cannot even begin to ponder a world without Kant.

Where would we be now if Kant had remained asleep?

Let's see... where can I begin...?

It may be seen as the bane of philosophy, and the boon of scepticism. We have all had the experience, especially with young children: an inquiring mind asks for an explanation, and upon giving the explanation, you are again asked a justification for this explanation, and on and on and on, until you have to say something to the effect of 'I don't know' or 'it just is', or you have to give a response akin to 'I don't have time for this'. It is the infinite regress. And it stems from the apparent absurdity of the 'causa incausata', the uncaused cause. In other words, it comes down to the question, how can something result from nothing (and/or itself)?

There are two main areas where this shows itself: in metaphysics, and in epistemology. In metaphysics, it arises because of the nature of time and its connection to causality: if something happens, there seemingly must be something that happened before it to cause it to be so; in epistemology (in which the problem is not so different) it follows the pattern of the above paragraph: if you want to argue for or establish a truth, you must provide a justification, but then this justification must also have a justification, and so on, ad infinitum.

The problem of the infinite regress is used mostly for a sceptical approach. One of the first (over 1500 years before Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and, arguably, the most illuminating summary of this idea is that of Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 AD) in his Outlines of Scepticism. He describes the two situations thus:

I) [Epistemic] [179] They do not concede that anything can be apprehended by means of something else. If that by means of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means of something else, they throw you into the reciprocal or infinite mode; and if you should want to assume that that by means of which another thing is apprehended is itself apprehended by means of itself, then this is countered by the fact that, for the above reasons [which I have excluded], nothing is apprehended by means of itself.

II) [Metaphysical] [185] The [causal] explanation which is offered will either be in agreement with all the philosophical schools as well as with Scepticism and what is apparent or it will not. No doubt it cannot be in agreement; for both what is apparent and what is unclear are all subject to dispute. [186] But if it is subject to dispute, we shall ask for an explanation for this explanation as well; and if he gives an apparent explanation for an apparent explanation or an unclear of an unclear, he will be thrown back ad infinitum, whereas if he gives his explanation crosswise he will fall into the reciprocal mode. If he takes a stand somewhere, then either he will say that the explanation holds so far as what he has said goes, and will introduce something relative, rejecting what is by nature, or else he will assume something as a hypothesis and be led to suspend judgment.


One should note, however, that Sextus is not an absolute sceptic i.e. he is careful to limit this to 'belief', whereas "[Pyrrhonian] Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances—for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences."

So what is to be done? Must we, when asked for an explanation, however simple, heed the same warning that Dante put above the gates of Hell in The Inferno, namely "Abandon hope all ye who enter here"?