The infinite regress crops up more than one might think. Consider the following fairly common theological argument:
A: Where did you come from?
B: My parents.
A: And where did they come?
B: My grandparents?
A: And where did they come?
B: Great grandparents.
A: But you can go back and back and back and back, and eventually you will have a problem, no? So there must be a Creator.
This is, in essence, the 'Cosmological Proof' of Thomas Aquinas. A short version is the following:
1. Every being is either a dependent or a self-existent being.
2. Not every being can be a dependent being.
3. Therefore there must be a self-existent being.
Of course, this does not tell us anything about the nature of this self-existent being. Indeed, a deist can turn around and say "that may be true, but why should this self-existent being care about us at all? If I walk along the beach, I leave footprints in the sand. I don't deny that these footprints cannot be uncaused, and that I am the cause, but it doesn't mean that I care about them after the fact." And indeed, an atheist can go further and say "why not just claim that the universe itself is a self-existent being?" (This would include the 'oscillating universe' cosmological theory.
So although the infinite regress may be a weapon for an argument, one must be careful that it is not turned against oneself!
Another area in which the infinite regress poses problems is with respect to the notion of 'a priori' knowledge. That is, knowledge prior to experience. Descartes, a rationalist, required an a priori justification for existence in his famous 'cogito ergo sum' argument. The clashes between the ideas of contemporaries Leibniz (the same Leibniz whose name arises in mathematics) and Locke with regard to whether or not a priori knowledge was possible is, in some ways, a definitive characterization of the difference between rationalism and empiricism.
Let us consider another major problem that the infinite regress points to: that of determinism. If everything must have a cause, then how is liberty/free will possible? This is a very important question, since its being posed by Hume in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding was what 'woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber'. Hume had concluded
"Whatever definition we may give to liberty, we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances; first, that it be consistent with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it[:] … liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence."
In other words, we can be 'free' with respect to constraint (e.g. not in prison), but our actions are necessitated by something else, i.e. according to Hume free will is impossible. One can conceive of it in the following way: consider every second or millisecond or ample 'division of time' as a 'frame' of existence. Then every 'frame' is somehow dependent on the previous 'frame'. If I suddenly 'choose' to go for a walk, it is only because there was something in the previous 'frame' that prompted me to do so, whatever that may have been.
Kant took this problem very seriously, and eventually attempted to argue that sponte (that is, uncaused events) can arise in the realm of thought. This prompted the German idealists after him: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer to name a few, to come up with a way to 'iron out' the problems with regard to Kant's notions of freedom, i.e. the 'uncaused cause', though Schopenhauer broke from this trend and, in his essay 'On the Freedom of the Will', sides with Hume and explains that there cannot be such a thing as free will. Kant is one of the most important philosophers in the history of modern philosophy. His ideas led the way to Hegel who led the way to Marx, et al, and to Schopenhauer who led the way to Nietzsche, et al. Schelling's is often considered to be the first person to coin the term 'unconscious' and his ideas are a major contribution to modern psychology.
So, we have a lot that we owe to the infinite regress, unless, of course, ignorance is, indeed, bliss. For one cannot even begin to ponder a world without Kant.
Where would we be now if Kant had remained asleep?
"It's not a matter of life and death... It's much more important than that."
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Let's see... where can I begin...?
It may be seen as the bane of philosophy, and the boon of scepticism. We have all had the experience, especially with young children: an inquiring mind asks for an explanation, and upon giving the explanation, you are again asked a justification for this explanation, and on and on and on, until you have to say something to the effect of 'I don't know' or 'it just is', or you have to give a response akin to 'I don't have time for this'. It is the infinite regress. And it stems from the apparent absurdity of the 'causa incausata', the uncaused cause. In other words, it comes down to the question, how can something result from nothing (and/or itself)?
There are two main areas where this shows itself: in metaphysics, and in epistemology. In metaphysics, it arises because of the nature of time and its connection to causality: if something happens, there seemingly must be something that happened before it to cause it to be so; in epistemology (in which the problem is not so different) it follows the pattern of the above paragraph: if you want to argue for or establish a truth, you must provide a justification, but then this justification must also have a justification, and so on, ad infinitum.
The problem of the infinite regress is used mostly for a sceptical approach. One of the first (over 1500 years before Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and, arguably, the most illuminating summary of this idea is that of Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 AD) in his Outlines of Scepticism. He describes the two situations thus:
I) [Epistemic] [179] They do not concede that anything can be apprehended by means of something else. If that by means of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means of something else, they throw you into the reciprocal or infinite mode; and if you should want to assume that that by means of which another thing is apprehended is itself apprehended by means of itself, then this is countered by the fact that, for the above reasons [which I have excluded], nothing is apprehended by means of itself.
II) [Metaphysical] [185] The [causal] explanation which is offered will either be in agreement with all the philosophical schools as well as with Scepticism and what is apparent or it will not. No doubt it cannot be in agreement; for both what is apparent and what is unclear are all subject to dispute. [186] But if it is subject to dispute, we shall ask for an explanation for this explanation as well; and if he gives an apparent explanation for an apparent explanation or an unclear of an unclear, he will be thrown back ad infinitum, whereas if he gives his explanation crosswise he will fall into the reciprocal mode. If he takes a stand somewhere, then either he will say that the explanation holds so far as what he has said goes, and will introduce something relative, rejecting what is by nature, or else he will assume something as a hypothesis and be led to suspend judgment.
One should note, however, that Sextus is not an absolute sceptic i.e. he is careful to limit this to 'belief', whereas "[Pyrrhonian] Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances—for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences."
So what is to be done? Must we, when asked for an explanation, however simple, heed the same warning that Dante put above the gates of Hell in The Inferno, namely "Abandon hope all ye who enter here"?
There are two main areas where this shows itself: in metaphysics, and in epistemology. In metaphysics, it arises because of the nature of time and its connection to causality: if something happens, there seemingly must be something that happened before it to cause it to be so; in epistemology (in which the problem is not so different) it follows the pattern of the above paragraph: if you want to argue for or establish a truth, you must provide a justification, but then this justification must also have a justification, and so on, ad infinitum.
The problem of the infinite regress is used mostly for a sceptical approach. One of the first (over 1500 years before Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and, arguably, the most illuminating summary of this idea is that of Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 AD) in his Outlines of Scepticism. He describes the two situations thus:
I) [Epistemic] [179] They do not concede that anything can be apprehended by means of something else. If that by means of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means of something else, they throw you into the reciprocal or infinite mode; and if you should want to assume that that by means of which another thing is apprehended is itself apprehended by means of itself, then this is countered by the fact that, for the above reasons [which I have excluded], nothing is apprehended by means of itself.
II) [Metaphysical] [185] The [causal] explanation which is offered will either be in agreement with all the philosophical schools as well as with Scepticism and what is apparent or it will not. No doubt it cannot be in agreement; for both what is apparent and what is unclear are all subject to dispute. [186] But if it is subject to dispute, we shall ask for an explanation for this explanation as well; and if he gives an apparent explanation for an apparent explanation or an unclear of an unclear, he will be thrown back ad infinitum, whereas if he gives his explanation crosswise he will fall into the reciprocal mode. If he takes a stand somewhere, then either he will say that the explanation holds so far as what he has said goes, and will introduce something relative, rejecting what is by nature, or else he will assume something as a hypothesis and be led to suspend judgment.
One should note, however, that Sextus is not an absolute sceptic i.e. he is careful to limit this to 'belief', whereas "[Pyrrhonian] Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances—for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences."
So what is to be done? Must we, when asked for an explanation, however simple, heed the same warning that Dante put above the gates of Hell in The Inferno, namely "Abandon hope all ye who enter here"?
Monday, February 7, 2011
Exegesis in the Bedroom
As outlandish and immoral as it may seem, Sade's 'approach' is not only shocking in terms of its details, it is also very important in terms of questioning some very fundamental moral values.
Having read du Plessix's Gray's At Home With the Marquis de Sade, it is known that the descriptions in his works are no mere fantasy, but, in some sense, accurately depict Sade's own 'approach' to life. Thus, works like Philosophy in the Bedroom may be seen as a sort of attempted justification and a challenge to the rest of the world, asking "why should the way I (choose to) live my life (i.e. with libertinism and debauchery aplenty) be deemed immoral and/or criminal?"
This is indeed a very good question, and one, in my opinion that shakes us to the very core. It is not difficult to come up with some fairly valid reasons why it should be deemed immoral for one to go out on rampages and commit mass murder, simply because your happiness is clearly at the expense of others, and it is a great expense; often another's life is the price one pays for the pleasures of such a 'homicidal maniac'.
But with morality 'in the bedroom', where (ideally) each is happy because of the pleasure that they are experiencing, why should such things be deemed 'sordid' and 'immoral'? After all, "it is only by sacrificing everything to the senses' pleasure that this individual, who never asked to be cast into this universe of woe, that this poor creature who goes under the name of Man, may be able to sow a smattering of roses atop the thorny path of life."
It is easy to come up with fairly substantial arguments that justify this stance towards debauchery when one considers it under the watchful eye of religion. In Christianity and many other religions that preach asceticism, such as many Eastern religions (Buddhism, Hinduishm, etc), the 'pleasures of the flesh' are quite clearly deemed 'sinful' since they fly in the face of the manner of self-denial and self-mortification that such religions dictate. But can one say that this treatment of debauchery as 'sordid' and 'immoral' can be ENTIRELY traced back to religion or, at the very least, some other authoritarian (e.g. monarchical or autocratic) creed?
Issues of health aside, there are issues of power and control that arise. A certain idea of 'freedom' can become very much under threat if the event is not completely 'egalitarian'. This is especially a concern when considered with regard to the largely patriarchal history of humanity, and indeed the simple biological fact that men are able to 'spread their seed' at will, while women are left to 'carry the can' for nine months at a time seems to tip the balance in favour of some sort of inequality. Of course, this does not apply to sexual practices where pregnancy cannot result for whatever reason, and these are most often treated as the most heinous of all. And although 'pleasure' might seem to be a substitute for happiness, issues of dignity and self-worth also come into play with regard to such an issue, so psychology also plays a major role: by being objectified, it becomes easier for one to objectify oneself, and this is, in some sense, a form of dehumanization. At the same time, though, this becomes a sort of chicken-egg problem: did self-worth and dignity arise because of asceticism and morality, or is it the other way around? In other words, is such sexual objectification of oneself or others deemed a form of dehumanization simply because it is, in most cases, not a socially acceptable human practice? E.g., education, which is seen as primary for the human race would never be seen as a form of dehumanization, even though it often seems to be becoming more and more the case that students are treated like cattle on an assembly line to cater to capitalistic needs/desires. This 'educational dehumanization' is especially a valid consideration with regard to some of the (supposedly) despotic educational set-ups they sometimes (supposedly) maintain in Eastern Europe and the Far East, though one can argue that 'rehumanization' occurs when the individual re-enters the greater world being able to reap education's benefits, whilst with debaucherous practices, the resulting advantage is not immediately clear.
Whatever the 'reasons', it is an important issue to consider. If we leave aside divine judgment, then who is to judge such an act but ourselves? And if this is so, why does it make us uncomfortable, especially if (if the heavy traffic on pornography sites is to be taken for an accurate survey of the interests of the general population), we are able to so easily fantasize about it? Is it due to social conditioning? Psychology? Conscience? Biology?
Or is it simply down to consequentialism, that one worries about opening a proverbial can of worms, since the penalties for debauchery are numerous (even outside social stigmata like criminal punishment and/or religious judgment), including injury, disease, being egregiously harmed by a jealous lover, etc: i.e., if one wishes to lead such a life, must they not only be a moral nihilist, but also an existential nihilist? And is this question based on the fact that such practices would now surely exist in the minority with respect to the general population (and therefore be treated with the utmost scrutiny, rather than accepted as justified), and not for any other reason?
Having read du Plessix's Gray's At Home With the Marquis de Sade, it is known that the descriptions in his works are no mere fantasy, but, in some sense, accurately depict Sade's own 'approach' to life. Thus, works like Philosophy in the Bedroom may be seen as a sort of attempted justification and a challenge to the rest of the world, asking "why should the way I (choose to) live my life (i.e. with libertinism and debauchery aplenty) be deemed immoral and/or criminal?"
This is indeed a very good question, and one, in my opinion that shakes us to the very core. It is not difficult to come up with some fairly valid reasons why it should be deemed immoral for one to go out on rampages and commit mass murder, simply because your happiness is clearly at the expense of others, and it is a great expense; often another's life is the price one pays for the pleasures of such a 'homicidal maniac'.
But with morality 'in the bedroom', where (ideally) each is happy because of the pleasure that they are experiencing, why should such things be deemed 'sordid' and 'immoral'? After all, "it is only by sacrificing everything to the senses' pleasure that this individual, who never asked to be cast into this universe of woe, that this poor creature who goes under the name of Man, may be able to sow a smattering of roses atop the thorny path of life."
It is easy to come up with fairly substantial arguments that justify this stance towards debauchery when one considers it under the watchful eye of religion. In Christianity and many other religions that preach asceticism, such as many Eastern religions (Buddhism, Hinduishm, etc), the 'pleasures of the flesh' are quite clearly deemed 'sinful' since they fly in the face of the manner of self-denial and self-mortification that such religions dictate. But can one say that this treatment of debauchery as 'sordid' and 'immoral' can be ENTIRELY traced back to religion or, at the very least, some other authoritarian (e.g. monarchical or autocratic) creed?
Issues of health aside, there are issues of power and control that arise. A certain idea of 'freedom' can become very much under threat if the event is not completely 'egalitarian'. This is especially a concern when considered with regard to the largely patriarchal history of humanity, and indeed the simple biological fact that men are able to 'spread their seed' at will, while women are left to 'carry the can' for nine months at a time seems to tip the balance in favour of some sort of inequality. Of course, this does not apply to sexual practices where pregnancy cannot result for whatever reason, and these are most often treated as the most heinous of all. And although 'pleasure' might seem to be a substitute for happiness, issues of dignity and self-worth also come into play with regard to such an issue, so psychology also plays a major role: by being objectified, it becomes easier for one to objectify oneself, and this is, in some sense, a form of dehumanization. At the same time, though, this becomes a sort of chicken-egg problem: did self-worth and dignity arise because of asceticism and morality, or is it the other way around? In other words, is such sexual objectification of oneself or others deemed a form of dehumanization simply because it is, in most cases, not a socially acceptable human practice? E.g., education, which is seen as primary for the human race would never be seen as a form of dehumanization, even though it often seems to be becoming more and more the case that students are treated like cattle on an assembly line to cater to capitalistic needs/desires. This 'educational dehumanization' is especially a valid consideration with regard to some of the (supposedly) despotic educational set-ups they sometimes (supposedly) maintain in Eastern Europe and the Far East, though one can argue that 'rehumanization' occurs when the individual re-enters the greater world being able to reap education's benefits, whilst with debaucherous practices, the resulting advantage is not immediately clear.
Whatever the 'reasons', it is an important issue to consider. If we leave aside divine judgment, then who is to judge such an act but ourselves? And if this is so, why does it make us uncomfortable, especially if (if the heavy traffic on pornography sites is to be taken for an accurate survey of the interests of the general population), we are able to so easily fantasize about it? Is it due to social conditioning? Psychology? Conscience? Biology?
Or is it simply down to consequentialism, that one worries about opening a proverbial can of worms, since the penalties for debauchery are numerous (even outside social stigmata like criminal punishment and/or religious judgment), including injury, disease, being egregiously harmed by a jealous lover, etc: i.e., if one wishes to lead such a life, must they not only be a moral nihilist, but also an existential nihilist? And is this question based on the fact that such practices would now surely exist in the minority with respect to the general population (and therefore be treated with the utmost scrutiny, rather than accepted as justified), and not for any other reason?
Friday, February 4, 2011
Philosophy in the Bedroom
To Libertines:
Voluptuaries of all ages, of every sex, it is to you only that I offer this work; nourish yourselves upon its principles: they favour your passions, and these passions, whereof coldly insipid moralists put you in fear, are naught but the means Nature employs to bring man to the ends she prescribes to him; harken only to these delicious promptings, for no voice save that of the passions can conduct you to happiness.
Lewd women, let the voluptuous Saint-Ange be your model; after her example, be heedless of all that contradicts pleasure's divine laws, by which all her life she was enchanted.
You young maidens, too long constrained by a fanciful Virtue's absurd and dangerous bonds and by those of a disgusting religion, imitate the fiery Eugénie; be as quick as she to destroy, to spurn all those ridiculous precepts inculcated in you by imbecile parents.
And you, amiable debauchees, you who since youth have known no limits but those of your desires and who have been governed by your caprices alone, study the cynical Dolmancé, proceed like him and go as far as he if you too would travel the length of those flowered ways your lechery prepares for you; in Dolmancé's academy be at last convinced it is only by exploring and enlarging the sphere of tastes and whims, it is only by sacrificing everything to the senses' pleasure that this individual, who never asked to be cast into this universe of woe, that this poor creature who goes under the name of Man, may be able to sow a smattering of roses atop the thorny path of life.
--The Marquis de Sade
"The supreme value of [Sade's] testimony lies in its ability to disturb us. It forces us to reexamine thoroughly the basic problem which haunts our age in different forms: the true relation between man and man."
--Simone de Beauvoir
Voluptuaries of all ages, of every sex, it is to you only that I offer this work; nourish yourselves upon its principles: they favour your passions, and these passions, whereof coldly insipid moralists put you in fear, are naught but the means Nature employs to bring man to the ends she prescribes to him; harken only to these delicious promptings, for no voice save that of the passions can conduct you to happiness.
Lewd women, let the voluptuous Saint-Ange be your model; after her example, be heedless of all that contradicts pleasure's divine laws, by which all her life she was enchanted.
You young maidens, too long constrained by a fanciful Virtue's absurd and dangerous bonds and by those of a disgusting religion, imitate the fiery Eugénie; be as quick as she to destroy, to spurn all those ridiculous precepts inculcated in you by imbecile parents.
And you, amiable debauchees, you who since youth have known no limits but those of your desires and who have been governed by your caprices alone, study the cynical Dolmancé, proceed like him and go as far as he if you too would travel the length of those flowered ways your lechery prepares for you; in Dolmancé's academy be at last convinced it is only by exploring and enlarging the sphere of tastes and whims, it is only by sacrificing everything to the senses' pleasure that this individual, who never asked to be cast into this universe of woe, that this poor creature who goes under the name of Man, may be able to sow a smattering of roses atop the thorny path of life.
--The Marquis de Sade
"The supreme value of [Sade's] testimony lies in its ability to disturb us. It forces us to reexamine thoroughly the basic problem which haunts our age in different forms: the true relation between man and man."
--Simone de Beauvoir
Thursday, February 3, 2011
What is an authentic experience?
Yesterday I was sitting in a pub in Rondebosch (the one I tend to frequent) and the pub, which is by all accounts a 'black' pub, was inundated with whites. It was rather amusing, since I knew that the reason likely had to do with the fact that the new school year is upon us, and there are American overseas students aplenty who are doing a semester abroad and mostly living in Rondebosch as near as possible to UCT. The pub in question is the main one down the hill from UCT, and clearly these curious folk have an eye for some 'cultural immersion'.
But then I got to thinking, isn't this sort of experience somewhat 'inauthentic'? Is it not the case that people see you as white or American or whatever before they see you as human, and doesn't that affect the way they approach and/or treat you? When my friends had temporarily left me sitting alone with my beer, a young white South African came up to me and, a bit tipsy, said 'nice to see a white bro at the Pig'. In terms of experience, authenticity seems to require that you are seen as a human being before you are seen as a certain TYPE of human being. It was similar when I was staying in Chamanculo; I wanted to know how people 'normally' acted, but given that I was a white guy walking around a slum in Maputo with a smile on my face and seemingly reckless abandon, their behaviour around me was obviously affected.
I suppose the best example of an 'authentic' experience is John Howard Griffin's experience in Black Like Me, e.g.:
* * *
I told myself that I was tired, that I must not judge these men who picked me up and for the price of a ride submitted me to the swamps of their fantasy lives. They showed me something that all men have but seldom bring to the surface, since most men seek health. The boy ended up wanting me to expose myself to him, saying he had never seen a Negro naked. I turned mute, indrawn, giving no answer. The silence rattled between us and I felt sorry for the reprimand that grew from me to him in the silence. I did not want this cruelty to him, since I knew that he showed me a side of his nature that was special to the night and the situation, a side rarely brought to light in his everyday living. I stared at the dimly lighted car dashboard and saw him attending an aunt’s funeral, having Sunday dinner with his parents, doing some kindness for a friend—for he was kind. How would I let him see that I understood and that I still respected him, and that I formed no judgment against him for this momentary slip? For instead of seeing it as a manifestation of some poor human charity, he might view it as confirmation that Negroes are insensitive to sexual aberration, that they think nothing of it—and this would carry on the legend that has so handicapped the Negro.
“I wasn’t going to do anything to you,” he said in a voice lifeless with humiliation. “I’m not queer or anything.”
“Of course not,” I said. “It’s nothing.”
“It’s just that I don’t get a chance to talk to educated Negroes—people that can answer questions.”
“You make it more complicated than it is,” I said. “If you want to know about the sexual morals of the Negro—his practices and ideals—it’s no mystery. These are human matters, and the Negro is the same human as the white man. Just ask yourself how it is for a white man and you’ll know the answers. Negro trash is the same as white trash. Negro decency is about the same, too.”
“But there are differences. The social studies I’ve read…”
“They don’t deal with any basic difference in human nature between black and white,” I said. “They only study the effects of environment on human nature. You place the white man in the ghetto, deprive him of educational advantages, arrange it so he has to struggle hard to fulfill his instinct for self-respect, give him little physical privacy and less leisure, and he would after a time assume the same characteristics you attach to the Negro. These characteristics don’t spring from whiteness or blackness, but from a man’s conditioning.”
“Yes, but Negroes have more illegitimate children, earlier loss of virginity and more crime—these are established facts,” he insisted without unkindness.
“The fact that the white race has the same problems proves these are not Negro characteristics, but the product of our condition as men,” I said. “When you force humans into a subhuman mode of existence, this always happens. Deprive a man of any contact with the pleasures of the spirit and he’ll fall completely into those of the flesh.”
“But we don’t deprive you people of the ‘pleasures of the spirit,’” he said.
“In most places we can’t go to the concerts, the theater, the museums, public lectures… or even to the library. Our schools in the South don’t compare to the white schools, poor as they are. You deprive a man of educational opportunities and he’ll have no knowledge of the great civilizing influences of art, history, literature, and philosophy. Many Negroes don’t even know these things exist. With practically nothing to exalt to the mind or exercise the spirit, any man is going to sink to his lowest depths. It becomes vicious—and tragic.”
“I can’t imagine how it must be,” he said. “I don’t think it’s fair. But just the same, plenty of whites don’t have access to these things—to art, literature, history, and philosophy. Some of the finest people I know live in the country where they never get to museums, concerts.”
“Living in the country, they are surrounded by natural museums and concerts,” I said. “Besides, those doors are always open to them. The Negro, too, fares better in the country. But most are deprived of education. Ignorance keeps them poor, and when a town-dwelling Negro is poor, he lives in the ghetto. His wife has to work usually, and this leaves the children without parental companionship. In such places, where all of man’s time is spent just surviving, he rarely knows what it means to read a great book. He has grown up and now sees his children grow up in squalor. His wife usually earns more than he. He is thwarted in his need to be father-of-the-household. When he looks at his children and his home, he feels the guilt of not having given them something better. His only salvation is not to give a damn finally, or else he will fall into despair. In despair, a man’s sense of virtue is dulled. He no longer cares. He will do anything to escape it—steal or commit acts of violence—or perhaps try to lose himself in sensuality. Most often the sex-king is just a poor devil trying to prove the manhood that his whole existence denies. This is what the whites call the ‘sorry nigger’. Soon he will either desert his home or become so unbearable he is kicked out. This leaves the mother to support the children alone. To keep food in their bellies, she has to spend most of her time away from them, working. This leaves the children to the streets, prey to any sight, any conversation, any sexual experiment that comes along to make their lives interesting or pleasurable. To a young girl who has nothing, has never known anything, the baubles she can get—both in a kind of crude affection and in gifts or money—by granting sex to a man or boy appeal to her as toys to a child. She gets pregnant sometimes and then the vicious cycle is given impetus. In some instances the mother cannot make enough to support her children, so she sells her sex for what she can get. This gets easier and easier until she comes up with still another child to abort or support. But none of this is ‘Negro-ness’.”
“I don’t know…” he sighed. “It looks like a man could do better.”
“It looks that way to you, because you can see what would be better. The Negro knows something is terribly wrong, but with things the way they are, he can’t know that something better actually exists on the other of work and study. We are all born blank. It’s the same for blacks or whites or any other shade of man. Your blanks have been filled in far differently from those of a child grown up in the filth and poverty of the ghetto.”
He drove without speaking through a thundershower that crinkled the windshield and raised the hum of his tires an octave.
“But the situation is changing,” I said after a time. “The Negro may not understand exactly how, but he knows one thing—the only way out of this tragedy is through education, training. Thousands of them sacrifice everything to get the education, to prove once and for all that the Negro’s capacity for learning, for accomplishment, is equal to that of any other man—that the pigment has nothing to do with degrees of intelligence, talent or virtue. This isn’t just wishful thinking. It’s been proved conclusively in every field.”
“We don’t hear about those things,” he said.
“I know. Southern newspapers print every rape, attempted rape, suspected rape, and ‘maybe rape’, but outstanding accomplishment is not considered newsworthy. Even the Southern Negro has little chance to know this, since he reads the same slanted reports in the newspapers.”
The young man slowed to a halt in a little settlement to let me out.
“I’m sorry about a while ago—I don’t know what got into me,” he said.
“I’ve already forgotten it.”
“No offense?”
“No offense.”
“Okay. Good luck to you.”
* * *
The truth is that for the fatally curious individual, you want people to be people, and you want to know what people are 'really' like, and it ends up being a sort of Catch-22 situation, since at the outset people treat you based on what they see in your appearance, and then once they get to know you, they treat you as a friend. There is seemingly no 'middle ground' where you can experience an authentic 'first impression' from another; i.e. 'pretend I'm just like anyone else; how would you react?' But in the end, maybe this is a good thing, because, as was discussed in the previous post, it means that there is no concept of 'normal': the unique attributes of any individual depict how he/she is reacted to. Still, though, I believe it would be nice to walk around a place like Khayelitsha without drawing attention to myself, to see how 'day-to-day struggles' unfold.
Maybe I need to have a talk with John Howard Griffin's dermatologist...
But then I got to thinking, isn't this sort of experience somewhat 'inauthentic'? Is it not the case that people see you as white or American or whatever before they see you as human, and doesn't that affect the way they approach and/or treat you? When my friends had temporarily left me sitting alone with my beer, a young white South African came up to me and, a bit tipsy, said 'nice to see a white bro at the Pig'. In terms of experience, authenticity seems to require that you are seen as a human being before you are seen as a certain TYPE of human being. It was similar when I was staying in Chamanculo; I wanted to know how people 'normally' acted, but given that I was a white guy walking around a slum in Maputo with a smile on my face and seemingly reckless abandon, their behaviour around me was obviously affected.
I suppose the best example of an 'authentic' experience is John Howard Griffin's experience in Black Like Me, e.g.:
* * *
I told myself that I was tired, that I must not judge these men who picked me up and for the price of a ride submitted me to the swamps of their fantasy lives. They showed me something that all men have but seldom bring to the surface, since most men seek health. The boy ended up wanting me to expose myself to him, saying he had never seen a Negro naked. I turned mute, indrawn, giving no answer. The silence rattled between us and I felt sorry for the reprimand that grew from me to him in the silence. I did not want this cruelty to him, since I knew that he showed me a side of his nature that was special to the night and the situation, a side rarely brought to light in his everyday living. I stared at the dimly lighted car dashboard and saw him attending an aunt’s funeral, having Sunday dinner with his parents, doing some kindness for a friend—for he was kind. How would I let him see that I understood and that I still respected him, and that I formed no judgment against him for this momentary slip? For instead of seeing it as a manifestation of some poor human charity, he might view it as confirmation that Negroes are insensitive to sexual aberration, that they think nothing of it—and this would carry on the legend that has so handicapped the Negro.
“I wasn’t going to do anything to you,” he said in a voice lifeless with humiliation. “I’m not queer or anything.”
“Of course not,” I said. “It’s nothing.”
“It’s just that I don’t get a chance to talk to educated Negroes—people that can answer questions.”
“You make it more complicated than it is,” I said. “If you want to know about the sexual morals of the Negro—his practices and ideals—it’s no mystery. These are human matters, and the Negro is the same human as the white man. Just ask yourself how it is for a white man and you’ll know the answers. Negro trash is the same as white trash. Negro decency is about the same, too.”
“But there are differences. The social studies I’ve read…”
“They don’t deal with any basic difference in human nature between black and white,” I said. “They only study the effects of environment on human nature. You place the white man in the ghetto, deprive him of educational advantages, arrange it so he has to struggle hard to fulfill his instinct for self-respect, give him little physical privacy and less leisure, and he would after a time assume the same characteristics you attach to the Negro. These characteristics don’t spring from whiteness or blackness, but from a man’s conditioning.”
“Yes, but Negroes have more illegitimate children, earlier loss of virginity and more crime—these are established facts,” he insisted without unkindness.
“The fact that the white race has the same problems proves these are not Negro characteristics, but the product of our condition as men,” I said. “When you force humans into a subhuman mode of existence, this always happens. Deprive a man of any contact with the pleasures of the spirit and he’ll fall completely into those of the flesh.”
“But we don’t deprive you people of the ‘pleasures of the spirit,’” he said.
“In most places we can’t go to the concerts, the theater, the museums, public lectures… or even to the library. Our schools in the South don’t compare to the white schools, poor as they are. You deprive a man of educational opportunities and he’ll have no knowledge of the great civilizing influences of art, history, literature, and philosophy. Many Negroes don’t even know these things exist. With practically nothing to exalt to the mind or exercise the spirit, any man is going to sink to his lowest depths. It becomes vicious—and tragic.”
“I can’t imagine how it must be,” he said. “I don’t think it’s fair. But just the same, plenty of whites don’t have access to these things—to art, literature, history, and philosophy. Some of the finest people I know live in the country where they never get to museums, concerts.”
“Living in the country, they are surrounded by natural museums and concerts,” I said. “Besides, those doors are always open to them. The Negro, too, fares better in the country. But most are deprived of education. Ignorance keeps them poor, and when a town-dwelling Negro is poor, he lives in the ghetto. His wife has to work usually, and this leaves the children without parental companionship. In such places, where all of man’s time is spent just surviving, he rarely knows what it means to read a great book. He has grown up and now sees his children grow up in squalor. His wife usually earns more than he. He is thwarted in his need to be father-of-the-household. When he looks at his children and his home, he feels the guilt of not having given them something better. His only salvation is not to give a damn finally, or else he will fall into despair. In despair, a man’s sense of virtue is dulled. He no longer cares. He will do anything to escape it—steal or commit acts of violence—or perhaps try to lose himself in sensuality. Most often the sex-king is just a poor devil trying to prove the manhood that his whole existence denies. This is what the whites call the ‘sorry nigger’. Soon he will either desert his home or become so unbearable he is kicked out. This leaves the mother to support the children alone. To keep food in their bellies, she has to spend most of her time away from them, working. This leaves the children to the streets, prey to any sight, any conversation, any sexual experiment that comes along to make their lives interesting or pleasurable. To a young girl who has nothing, has never known anything, the baubles she can get—both in a kind of crude affection and in gifts or money—by granting sex to a man or boy appeal to her as toys to a child. She gets pregnant sometimes and then the vicious cycle is given impetus. In some instances the mother cannot make enough to support her children, so she sells her sex for what she can get. This gets easier and easier until she comes up with still another child to abort or support. But none of this is ‘Negro-ness’.”
“I don’t know…” he sighed. “It looks like a man could do better.”
“It looks that way to you, because you can see what would be better. The Negro knows something is terribly wrong, but with things the way they are, he can’t know that something better actually exists on the other of work and study. We are all born blank. It’s the same for blacks or whites or any other shade of man. Your blanks have been filled in far differently from those of a child grown up in the filth and poverty of the ghetto.”
He drove without speaking through a thundershower that crinkled the windshield and raised the hum of his tires an octave.
“But the situation is changing,” I said after a time. “The Negro may not understand exactly how, but he knows one thing—the only way out of this tragedy is through education, training. Thousands of them sacrifice everything to get the education, to prove once and for all that the Negro’s capacity for learning, for accomplishment, is equal to that of any other man—that the pigment has nothing to do with degrees of intelligence, talent or virtue. This isn’t just wishful thinking. It’s been proved conclusively in every field.”
“We don’t hear about those things,” he said.
“I know. Southern newspapers print every rape, attempted rape, suspected rape, and ‘maybe rape’, but outstanding accomplishment is not considered newsworthy. Even the Southern Negro has little chance to know this, since he reads the same slanted reports in the newspapers.”
The young man slowed to a halt in a little settlement to let me out.
“I’m sorry about a while ago—I don’t know what got into me,” he said.
“I’ve already forgotten it.”
“No offense?”
“No offense.”
“Okay. Good luck to you.”
* * *
The truth is that for the fatally curious individual, you want people to be people, and you want to know what people are 'really' like, and it ends up being a sort of Catch-22 situation, since at the outset people treat you based on what they see in your appearance, and then once they get to know you, they treat you as a friend. There is seemingly no 'middle ground' where you can experience an authentic 'first impression' from another; i.e. 'pretend I'm just like anyone else; how would you react?' But in the end, maybe this is a good thing, because, as was discussed in the previous post, it means that there is no concept of 'normal': the unique attributes of any individual depict how he/she is reacted to. Still, though, I believe it would be nice to walk around a place like Khayelitsha without drawing attention to myself, to see how 'day-to-day struggles' unfold.
Maybe I need to have a talk with John Howard Griffin's dermatologist...
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
What is normal?
It is easy to answer that question with regard to a 'thing'. It is 'normal' if it is devoid of defects. A 'normal' tomato would be one devoid of defects, or a 'normal' rock might be one that has managed to avoid being encrusted with dirt or barnacles. Normalcy can even be extended to animals: one can discern between a 'normal' dog and a rabid dog, a 'normal' horse and a lame horse, etc.
But when consciousness comes into the picture, it is a different story. One can only make comparisons based on outward appearances of others, and since consciousness is an entirely internal phenomenon it presents two problems: first, how can one know if another person is 'normal' if one cannot see into another's consciousness and internal thoughts, and second, how can one know if one's own consciousness (and therefore oneself) is 'normal' if there are no other known consciousnesses that it can be properly compared to?
So if one wishes to appeal to a notion of normalcy within humans, one is limited to assumptions based on observable acts in others. If one sees another constantly in tears where everyone else maintains a more sober expression, one may have strong grounds to believe that such a person is not 'normal', or, at the very least, not in a 'normal' frame of mind.
The danger, however, is when one begins to equate 'normalcy' with 'predictability'. If one is playing chess, for example, a queen sacrifice would be considered an 'abnormal' phenomenon because it has a very low percentage chance of occurring in a given game. One might say "I didn't see that coming", i.e. I couldn't PREDICT that that would occur. And so one's idea of a normal person might be heavily skewed towards a seemingly equivalent notion of a person whose actions are predictable, whereas one who is constantly acting in such a way that seems 'out of the blue' may be seen as 'abnormal' since one ascertains that their consciousness and thoughts patterns are working in a different manner than what the norm might be deemed to be. However, it is only through the unpredictable that we can have the notion of the 'new' and forms of 'development'. An inventor, especially one as ingenious as Da Vinci would, with good reason, be deemed highly 'abnormal' given the machines and/or artwork that he is able to conceive of.
But then we must conclude that 'abnormal' is not a bad thing. On the contrary, it is what allows the human race to evolve from a species of cave-dwelling creatures to what they are today. Indeed, to see that 'abnormalcy' is good, we need only consider the notion of 'normalcy' in lieu of evolutionary biology and genetics, wherein evolution is deemed to occur through genetic aberration or mutation or some form of aberrant behaviour.
Of course, not all such aberrations can be deemed 'good', and indeed some genetic mutation that cause sterility or severe mental incapacitation or actions that reflect said 'problems' could not be considered 'good' at all, even if they should be deemed 'abnormal'. When I ride the local trains in Cape Town, oftentimes there are individuals who will preach fanatically and endlessly about Christianity, and the salvation provided by God through Jesus Christ. I will think to myself 'if the topic of your sermon was not religion, I'm fairly certain you would be locked up by now', which goes to show how 'normal' religion and theology have also become, but even further than this, how normal it has become to advocate your religion through preaching and recruiting on the one hand, while discrediting other religions on the other. It is akin to the idea that if you take out a machine gun and mow down a bunch of people in a quiet village, you are seen as VERY 'abnormal', but if it is in the heat of a battle or war, it is not only acknowledged as acceptable, but even encouraged. So 'normalcy' must also depend on a social context.
Despite these problems, we cannot deny that it is because of the 'abnormal' that we have all of the machinery and luxuries and ideas and entertainment and 'interesting' things of the world today. And so in the end, I must put my lot behind Giota, who, when she came to the door to greet me the first time I arrived in Los Angeles six or so years ago completely unknown and completely unannounced and heard me say "I'll try to explain but you'll think I'm crazy" calmly replied
"Crazy is good."
But when consciousness comes into the picture, it is a different story. One can only make comparisons based on outward appearances of others, and since consciousness is an entirely internal phenomenon it presents two problems: first, how can one know if another person is 'normal' if one cannot see into another's consciousness and internal thoughts, and second, how can one know if one's own consciousness (and therefore oneself) is 'normal' if there are no other known consciousnesses that it can be properly compared to?
So if one wishes to appeal to a notion of normalcy within humans, one is limited to assumptions based on observable acts in others. If one sees another constantly in tears where everyone else maintains a more sober expression, one may have strong grounds to believe that such a person is not 'normal', or, at the very least, not in a 'normal' frame of mind.
The danger, however, is when one begins to equate 'normalcy' with 'predictability'. If one is playing chess, for example, a queen sacrifice would be considered an 'abnormal' phenomenon because it has a very low percentage chance of occurring in a given game. One might say "I didn't see that coming", i.e. I couldn't PREDICT that that would occur. And so one's idea of a normal person might be heavily skewed towards a seemingly equivalent notion of a person whose actions are predictable, whereas one who is constantly acting in such a way that seems 'out of the blue' may be seen as 'abnormal' since one ascertains that their consciousness and thoughts patterns are working in a different manner than what the norm might be deemed to be. However, it is only through the unpredictable that we can have the notion of the 'new' and forms of 'development'. An inventor, especially one as ingenious as Da Vinci would, with good reason, be deemed highly 'abnormal' given the machines and/or artwork that he is able to conceive of.
But then we must conclude that 'abnormal' is not a bad thing. On the contrary, it is what allows the human race to evolve from a species of cave-dwelling creatures to what they are today. Indeed, to see that 'abnormalcy' is good, we need only consider the notion of 'normalcy' in lieu of evolutionary biology and genetics, wherein evolution is deemed to occur through genetic aberration or mutation or some form of aberrant behaviour.
Of course, not all such aberrations can be deemed 'good', and indeed some genetic mutation that cause sterility or severe mental incapacitation or actions that reflect said 'problems' could not be considered 'good' at all, even if they should be deemed 'abnormal'. When I ride the local trains in Cape Town, oftentimes there are individuals who will preach fanatically and endlessly about Christianity, and the salvation provided by God through Jesus Christ. I will think to myself 'if the topic of your sermon was not religion, I'm fairly certain you would be locked up by now', which goes to show how 'normal' religion and theology have also become, but even further than this, how normal it has become to advocate your religion through preaching and recruiting on the one hand, while discrediting other religions on the other. It is akin to the idea that if you take out a machine gun and mow down a bunch of people in a quiet village, you are seen as VERY 'abnormal', but if it is in the heat of a battle or war, it is not only acknowledged as acceptable, but even encouraged. So 'normalcy' must also depend on a social context.
Despite these problems, we cannot deny that it is because of the 'abnormal' that we have all of the machinery and luxuries and ideas and entertainment and 'interesting' things of the world today. And so in the end, I must put my lot behind Giota, who, when she came to the door to greet me the first time I arrived in Los Angeles six or so years ago completely unknown and completely unannounced and heard me say "I'll try to explain but you'll think I'm crazy" calmly replied
"Crazy is good."
Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Philosophy IS sexy (or it simply attracts the insane)
There have been numerous examples in history of dangerous liaisons occurring within the greater philosophy community. A primary example would be what went on between Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger when she was a student of his. Heidegger had controversially backed National Socialism (the Nazi movement), once describing it after its disintegration as 'a grand social experiment gone horribly wrong'. Arendt, on the other hand, was a German Jew, so the liaison was dangerous indeed, culminating in the need for Heidegger to send Arendt to do her PhD under Karl Jaspers. I dont know all the details, but from what I know, Arendt's relationship to Heidegger blew very hot and cold and her philosophy during her time with Heidegger (after which she was heavily influenced by Jaspers and Aristotle to conceive of the notion of 'political action' and take a strong stand against the so-called 'totalitarian' regimes of the day) at times reflects Heidegger's own phenomenological musings, and at times challenges them directly. Moreover, her acceptance of not only Heidegger's themes and ideas but their relationship in general more than likely became more strained and possibly estranged by Jaspers' estrangement from Heidegger over Heidegger's support of National Socialism.
The most famous example would probably be one of the real 'Don Juans' of modern philosophy: Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre was not an overly attractive individual physically (the fact that he suffered from strabismus would have put a damper on this) but his numerous liaisons—not only the 'main' polyamorous one with de Beauvoir, but with numerous students of his, some many decades younger—is legendary. The book 'Hearts and minds: The common journey of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre' by Axel Madsen is a beautifully written and very complex book about what can only be described as 'existential love'. I recall a story that was put to me by the boyfriend (now husband) of a friend of mine who studied philosophy under Robert Birch. Birch was a student of Gadamer and, as I was told, once went to Paris and rented a flat along a road that was apparently frequented by Sartre at the time (Sartre died in 1980). So the story goes (if I remember correctly) there was no sign of Sartre until the last day when Birch happened to look out the window and see Sartre slowly walking by on the arm of a very young woman. At that moment, a taxi pulled up along side him and Simone de Beauvoir got out and began accosting and (apparently) attacking him with her purse. Perhaps an urban myth, but sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.
The final story is one of the strangest in the history of philosophy. It involves a fairly little-known philosopher by the name of Moritz Schlick. Schlick was in charge of putting together and chairing the 'Vienna Circle', which was a group of logical positivist philosophers who based their approach to philosophy on 'Wittgenstein I' and the Tractatus (see the entry 'Luki'). It included such individuals as Carnap, Neurath, Gödel, and others. But if Schlick was not so well-known, what sets him apart?
The wikipedia article on Schlick states:
"With the rise of the Nazis in Germany and Austria, many of the Vienna Circle's members left for America and the United Kingdom. Schlick, however, stayed on at the University of Vienna. When visited by Herbert Feigl in 1935, he expressed dismay at events in Germany. On June 22, 1936, Schlick was ascending the steps of the University for a class when he was confronted by a former student, Johann Nelböck, who drew a pistol and shot him in the chest. Nelbock claimed that Schlick's philosophy had "interfered with his moral restraint" - by which he probably meant that under the encouragement of Schlick's philosophy he had indulged himself homosexually, and in a paranoid displacement blamed Schlick for his "defilement". Schlick died very soon afterward. The student was tried and sentenced, but he became a cause célèbre for the growing anti-Jewish sentiments in the city. (That Schlick was not Jewish tended to be overlooked.) Nelböck was paroled after serving 2 years of a 10 year sentence & shortly afterward became a member of the Austrian Nazi Party after the Anschluss."
However, in the book 'Wittgenstein's Poker', other theories have been put forward for Nelbock's actions. One such theory is based on the fact that apparently Nelbock regularly attended Schlick's lectures, often sitting alone at the back of the room. It is said that he became incredibly infatuated with one of Schlick's female students, who often sat in the front row of Schlick's lectures. The theory goes that Nelbock believed that there was something going on between Schlick and this woman and the assassination was the result of jealous rage in a deranged individual.
That explanation is so much more interesting.
The most famous example would probably be one of the real 'Don Juans' of modern philosophy: Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre was not an overly attractive individual physically (the fact that he suffered from strabismus would have put a damper on this) but his numerous liaisons—not only the 'main' polyamorous one with de Beauvoir, but with numerous students of his, some many decades younger—is legendary. The book 'Hearts and minds: The common journey of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre' by Axel Madsen is a beautifully written and very complex book about what can only be described as 'existential love'. I recall a story that was put to me by the boyfriend (now husband) of a friend of mine who studied philosophy under Robert Birch. Birch was a student of Gadamer and, as I was told, once went to Paris and rented a flat along a road that was apparently frequented by Sartre at the time (Sartre died in 1980). So the story goes (if I remember correctly) there was no sign of Sartre until the last day when Birch happened to look out the window and see Sartre slowly walking by on the arm of a very young woman. At that moment, a taxi pulled up along side him and Simone de Beauvoir got out and began accosting and (apparently) attacking him with her purse. Perhaps an urban myth, but sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.
The final story is one of the strangest in the history of philosophy. It involves a fairly little-known philosopher by the name of Moritz Schlick. Schlick was in charge of putting together and chairing the 'Vienna Circle', which was a group of logical positivist philosophers who based their approach to philosophy on 'Wittgenstein I' and the Tractatus (see the entry 'Luki'). It included such individuals as Carnap, Neurath, Gödel, and others. But if Schlick was not so well-known, what sets him apart?
The wikipedia article on Schlick states:
"With the rise of the Nazis in Germany and Austria, many of the Vienna Circle's members left for America and the United Kingdom. Schlick, however, stayed on at the University of Vienna. When visited by Herbert Feigl in 1935, he expressed dismay at events in Germany. On June 22, 1936, Schlick was ascending the steps of the University for a class when he was confronted by a former student, Johann Nelböck, who drew a pistol and shot him in the chest. Nelbock claimed that Schlick's philosophy had "interfered with his moral restraint" - by which he probably meant that under the encouragement of Schlick's philosophy he had indulged himself homosexually, and in a paranoid displacement blamed Schlick for his "defilement". Schlick died very soon afterward. The student was tried and sentenced, but he became a cause célèbre for the growing anti-Jewish sentiments in the city. (That Schlick was not Jewish tended to be overlooked.) Nelböck was paroled after serving 2 years of a 10 year sentence & shortly afterward became a member of the Austrian Nazi Party after the Anschluss."
However, in the book 'Wittgenstein's Poker', other theories have been put forward for Nelbock's actions. One such theory is based on the fact that apparently Nelbock regularly attended Schlick's lectures, often sitting alone at the back of the room. It is said that he became incredibly infatuated with one of Schlick's female students, who often sat in the front row of Schlick's lectures. The theory goes that Nelbock believed that there was something going on between Schlick and this woman and the assassination was the result of jealous rage in a deranged individual.
That explanation is so much more interesting.
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